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ABSTRACT
ANALYZING THE ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED
REGULATIONS
ON VOLUME AND QUALITY INDICATORS
FOR HEART AND KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION
by
Courtney Cosby, PhD., Public Policy and Administration
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011
Committee Chair:
Dr. Carolyn L. Funk, Director, Center for Public Policy and Commonwealth Poll

States have historically used Certificate of Need (CON) regulations to regulate
cost, quality, and access to healthcare services. Federally mandated in 1974, the regulation
required the states to review requests for new healthcare construction and services. In
theory, community-level planning backed by the state-level CON review and health
planning process would prevent unnecessary duplication of services and the accompanying
costs (Smith-Mellot, 2004). However, none of the published studies have examined the
association of CON regulation on volume and outcomes of solid organ transplants.
In 1984, the federal mandate ended, and each state was allowed to determine
whether or not to maintain its CON programs; more than one-third of the states eliminated
them (Altman & Ostby, 1991). Currently, 37 states including the District of Columbia
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have CON programs (American Health Planning, 2010). Of those states, 21 include organ
transplant as a reviewable, regulated service.
Although several studies have investigated whether CON regulation has affected
healthcare cost, to date very little has been written about the impact of CON on volume
and quality of care; the data that does exist is contradictory. In 1988, investigators studied
the effects of CON regulation on mortality and observed that greater regulatory stringency
was a positive and significant predictor of hospital mortality rates (Shortell & Hughes,
1988). In contrast, DiSesa et al (2006) found no significant difference in risk-adjusted
mortality for cardiac surgery patients in states with and without CON regulations. The gap
between evidence and decision-making and the large number of states that use CON to
regulate healthcare services indicate a need for a study on the quality of healthcare
services. Solid organ transplantation is a complex, high-cost treatment that was performed
over 27,000 times in 2008.
The purpose of this study is to assess the association of solid organ transplant CON
regulations using clinically rich data available from the Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients (SRTR). This study tests the hypotheses that states with solid organ transplant
CON regulations have fewer transplant centers, higher volumes of heart and kidney
transplants per center, lower graft failure rates and lower patient mortality rates per center.
In addition, this study assesses these hypotheses using two different transplant procedures
(heart and kidney). This study provides additional information for transplant centers to use
in their strategic decision making. Moreover, with the presence of minimum volume
standards for transplant procedures mandated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
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(CMS) now, the policy implications of continuing or repealing CON regulations should be
examined.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Within the last year a major healthcare bill was passed that will reform the U.S.
healthcare system and it was one of the President‘s top legislative priorities. Policy
makers and providers seek to ensure the provision of high-quality healthcare while
restraining cost growth. Many states pursue these two goals by enforcing Certificate of
Need (CON) programs. CON is a regulatory system that requires healthcare providers
to obtain prior authorization from the state for major capital expenditures and the
offering of new or expanded services (Hyman, 1977). CON regulations are intended to
contain healthcare costs, ensure equal access and quality. When CON regulation was
first implemented, healthcare providers were reimbursed based on the cost of the
services they provided, no matter how high that cost. Their charges incorporated
overhead expenses and the other costs of doing business, as well as the necessary profit
margin. Under this system overbuilding was costly because the expenses of inefficiency
were built into reimbursement. The regulatory mechanism of CON regulations was
designed to control costs by limiting the expansion and duplication of services.
Now, some thirty years later, the competitive forces of managed care have
transformed healthcare. Provider payments are determined by capitation, fixed fees for
services, and fee schedules that are the product of negotiation and have little or no
bearing on the underlying costs. Today‘s providers compete on price and quality of care
– not costs—and are neither rewarded for nor bailed out when they overspend on
facilities or technology. Given these fundamental shifts, it is particularly important to
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examine the effect of CON regulations. Is CON relevant in today‘s healthcare
environment?
Regulation of healthcare resources began in 1948, with the passage of the Hospital
Survey and Construction Act (PL 79-725), commonly known as the Hill-Burton Act. The
Act was intended to encourage the development of hospitals in rural areas because of a
perceived shortage of healthcare facilities (Dunham, 1981). The Act required states to
institute health policy planning in order to receive federal funding for hospital construction
(Sloan, 1988).
Additional concerns were duplicated services and excess supply of equipment.
Under fee-for-service insurance, hospitals would be fully reimbursed for the amount spent
on patients. Hospitals were also paid their total costs for services rendered to the elderly
and the poor after the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966. The extensive
coverage of hospital services from third-party payers had two effects: it removed patients‘
incentive to look for the best offer, and hospitals being assured of profit by the payment
methods had no incentive to be concerned with efficiency and the costs of treatment.
Small hospitals emulated medical centers by adopting the latest technology and
expensive equipment, disregarding the economy of scale. The larger the number of
hospitals in a community, the greater the need for each hospital to invest in expensive
equipment to attract physicians and patients. This non-price competition is termed as
―medical arms race‖ (McGinley, 1995). In addition, since hospitals were fully reimbursed,
they could increase the capacity by adding more beds even when the occupancy rates were
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low. As a result, excess capacity and ―medical arms race‖ contributed to the ever-rising
healthcare costs.
As an attempt to control the supply side of the healthcare market to contain costs,
in 1974, Congress passed the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
(PL 93-641), which mandated each state to designate health planning agencies for CON
reviews to determine whether the proposed projects were necessary for the needs of local
communities. Despite its intended purpose of restraining healthcare costs, the medical bill
reached $332 billion in 1982, the first time the cost of healthcare exceeded 10% of the
gross domestic product (GDP) (McGinley, 1995). Subsequently, Congress repealed the
mandate for state CON regulations in January, 1987. Each state, however, was free to
continue regulating healthcare facilities.
Since then, 14 states have dropped CON regulations. Conover and Sloan (1998)
proposed several reasons why some states have chosen to abandon CON regulations. In
addition to CON, two other types of regulations were implemented to hold down costs. In
the late 1980s, Medicare adopted the Prospective Payment System (PPS), which greatly
weakened hospitals‘ incentive to inflate costs and the growth of Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) that pressured hospitals to lower costs by negotiating discounted
rates. Taken together, many policy makers believed that these regulations and market
pressures would control healthcare costs, without CON laws.
Today, the 37 states (and the District of Columbia) (see Appendix 1) that retain
CON regulations have made them more flexible by raising review thresholds and limiting
the scope of the regulations (Conover & Sloan, 1998).
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The coverage and review thresholds vary considerably across these states.
According to the 2010 National Directory State Certificate of Need Programs published by
the American Health Planning Association (AHPA) (see Appendix 2), Vermont covers 30
types of healthcare services and equipment, the highest coverage rate of all states. Ohio
has the lowest coverage: only for nursing home and long-term care beds. Only 21 of the
37 states that still have CON regulations include organ transplant services.
While CON laws are a result of federal legislation, CON programs, where they
exist, are based on state statutes, rules and regulations which designate an agency or board
to administer the process of reviewing CON applications and authorize the CON
regulatory review board or commission to promulgate regulations specifying the criteria by
which CON applications are evaluated. These criteria are commonly required to be created
in conjunction with the state‘s long-term health plans and goals. In the states where CON
regulations are still in effect, CON programs constitute the most frequently used form of
state health planning (Madden, 1999).
The original intent of CON statutes was to control costs by regulating major capital
expenditures and changes in healthcare services capacity (Chayer & Sonnenreich, 1978).
CON regulations were designed to prevent duplication of healthcare services. CON
regulations are based on the theory that in an unregulated market, healthcare providers will
provide the newest, most costly technology and equipment, regardless of duplication or
need (Feldstein, 2005). According to Ameringer (2008), if policy makers thought that
government regulation in the 1970s would ―stem rising costs of healthcare, they were
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mistaken‖ (p. 57). Although CON regulations were intended to reduce healthcare costs by
preventing duplication of services, healthcare costs continued to rise.
The use of CON programs as a means of ensuring quality of care has been a matter
of debate (Conover & Sloan, 1998). Vaughan-Sarrazin et al. (2006) supported the
contention that CON laws both increase coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) volumes and
improve patient outcomes. This analysis was limited to elderly patients, did not control for
regional factors and, due to its reliance on an administrative database, did not adjust fully
for clinical factors. DiSesa (2006) found that CON states have higher hospital volumes but
not better outcomes for coronary artery bypass grafting. Supporting this finding, Ho
(2004) and Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin and Rosenthal (2006) both concluded that CON
states have higher hospital cardiac procedure volumes but not better outcomes than do
states without CON regulations.
The association between volume and outcomes appears to be strong. Several
studies (Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Ho, 2004; Schrag et al., 2003) base their conclusions that
increased volume decreases mortality among patients in high- and low-volume hospitals.
Mortality rate, the likelihood to survive the procedure, is not the best or even the only
indicator of quality outcomes. Other indicators are likelihood of experiencing
complications (complication rate), probability that a patient may be readmitted to the
hospital (readmission rate), and length of stay. In addition, patient data in the volume
studies are often not ―risk-adjusted.‖ Risk adjustment takes into account the severity of a
patient‘s illness upon admission to the hospital, and is necessary for an apple-to-apple
comparison.
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CON regulations also were intended to ensure quality of care and clinical
proficiency by limiting the number of healthcare facilities performing complex medical
procedures. More than 100 studies have established a strong relationship between higher
provider procedure volume and better outcomes (Conover & Sloan, 1998). Luft, Bunker,
and Enthoven conducted the pioneering study noting this link in 1979. After another
decade of research, Luft et al. (1990) reviewed the literature and concluded that there was a
link between volume and quality. Because CON is not associated with substantially
lowering healthcare costs (Conover & Sloan, 1998; Sloan & Steinwald, 1980), the
reluctance to eliminate CON regulation may be partly attributable to the impact on quality.
The Institute of Medicine‘s (IOM) reports, To Err is Human; Building a Safer
Health System (Kohn, Corrigan & Donalson,1999) and Crossing the Quality Chasm: A
New Health System for the 21st Century (2001) gave the healthcare industry a charge to
make healthcare in America safer and of consistently high quality. All stakeholders in care
are to be held accountable. The second report outlines six aims for improving the
healthcare system: all healthcare should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely,
efficient, and equitable. Multiple stakeholders have a significant interest in using
legislation or other regulatory means to ensure affordable and high quality healthcare for
everyone. This is especially true for treatments like coronary artery bypass grafting, in
which differences in procedural quality can have a direct impact on patient outcomes.
New York and Pennsylvania were among the first states to require all hospitals and
practitioners performing CABG surgery to report case volumes and outcomes annually.
Other states have followed. Although the results of these surveys are available to the
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public, their effects on quality of care have been difficult to measure (Birkmeyer, 2002).
Other stakeholders, such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and
industry consortia of high-volume purchasers of healthcare services (the Leapfrog Group,
for example) have proposed volume and/or outcome criteria for certification of and
payment for expensive services such as CABG surgery.
There is growing interest in the quality of healthcare and in the use of quality
measures to direct patients to hospitals and providers offering high quality, low cost
healthcare (Epstein, 1995; Clinton, 1993; Enthoven & Kronick, 1989). Although
tremendous strides in the development of quality measures have been made, there is still
little agreement on what constitutes "quality,‖ how it should be measured, and how quality
information should be used. Some experts predict that it may be another 10 years before
highly reliable and valid quality measures will be widely available (IOM, 2001). The
dilemma is that, while there is an increasing need for quality indicators as a result of a
changing healthcare environment, this new environment has important implications for the
use of these measures.
Since the 1970s, a growing body of research in the U.S. has addressed the
empirical relationship between the number of surgical procedure and the outcomes after
treatment in a particular hospital or by a particular physician ("volume-outcome" studies).
Virtually all of the studies examining the relationship between volumes and outcomes
have been conducted in the U.S. (a few have been conducted in Canada) (Banta, Engel &
Schersten, 1992). One reason is that European countries routinely regulate the number of
facilities that are allowed to perform certain procedures, and thus there are fewer
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institutions with low volumes. The ready availability of routinely collected data on
procedures, diagnoses, and outcomes in the U.S. also facilitates such research (Banta,
Engel & Schersten, 1992).
The use of volume information in a regulatory context emerged from a healthcare
market in the U.S. where cost-based reimbursement was still the norm, hospitals were the
center of healthcare delivery, and the "medical arms race" drove hospitals to compete for
physicians and their patients by offering more services and possibly better quality,
although the latter was rarely measured explicitly. Today, the driving market factors are a
focus on consumer decision-making, the increasing dominance of managed care
organizations, the consolidation of health plans and facilities, and the use of selective
contracting through negotiations with purchasers. This changing environment has added
new complexities in using volume information, as well as other quality indicators, within
both regulatory and market-oriented environments.
Despite this growing interest in assessing surgical quality, there remains
controversy about how best to identify high-quality hospitals for individual procedures.
Hospital procedure volume is currently among the most widely used quality indicators.
There remains little doubt that volume is inversely related to mortality with many
procedures (Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Dudley et al., 2000; Halm et al., 2002). But critics
state that volume is a crude surrogate for quality and a poor predictor of individual hospital
performance (Christian et al., 2003; Hannan, 1999; Rathore et al., 2004). Instead, many
think that surgical quality is best judged by direct outcome measures, including mortality.
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Overview of Study
Because of the lack of research for transplant procedures and the questions related
to the best measures of quality, this study examines structure measure (centers and center‘s
volume) as well as outcome measures (graft failure and patient death). The question under
examination by this study is whether or not solid organ transplant CON regulations for
heart and kidney transplants makes a differences in the number of transplant centers and
volume per center as well as the quality outcomes for transplant centers in states with and
without solid organ transplant CON regulations. Previous studies have examined the
impact of CON on volume and quality for coronary artery bypass grafts and coronary
interventions but no studies have been done for the transplant populations. This study
would add to that knowledge and provide additional information for transplant centers to
use in their strategic decision making. With the presence of minimum volume standards
for transplant procedures mandated by CMS, the policy implication of continuing or
repealing CON laws should be examined.
The next chapter provides an overview of the history of Certificate of Need, the
theoretical basis for CON laws, and the intent and structure of CON regulations. The third
chapter explores the relevant research. Studies of the quality, access, cost and expenditures
of CON are reviewed.
Following the literature review, the study question and methodology utilized for
this study are explained. This study will use a clinically-rich database available from the
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) on 101 adult heart transplant centers
and 208 adult kidney transplant centers within the United States. The years of study will
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be 2006 through 2008, when the number of states with CON regulations for heart and
kidney transplantation remained stable. The variables of interest will be the number of
transplant centers per state, the volume of transplants per center and the risk-adjusted graft
failures and patient deaths per transplant center. This study question is: What is the
association of solid organ transplant CON regulations on the number of transplant centers
per state and the volume and outcomes at heart and kidney transplant centers?

10

CHAPTER II
CERTIFICATE OF NEED

In 1964, local businesses and Blue Cross in Rochester, New York established a
community health planning council composed of payers, consumers and providers to
evaluate the need for hospital beds. The council concluded that there was a surplus. This
work led to the passing of the nation‘s first Certificate of Need (CON) regulations by the
State of New York in 1966 (Dunham, 1981). State and federal involvement in planning for
health facilities has an extensive and well-documented history. The regulation of
healthcare resources began after World War II, with the passage of the Hospital Survey
and Construction Act (Dunham, 1981), commonly known as the Hill-Burton Act (PL 79725), in 1946. The enactment of federal CON regulations was the genesis of governmentmandated health policy planning. While federal regulations provided legislation and
enforcement provisions, most program development and implementation has taken place
on the state or local level (McGinley, 1995).
The objective of CON regulations was to control costs by restricting provider
capital expenditures. The principle behind CON regulations is that excess capacity (in the
form of facility overbuilding) directly inflates healthcare prices. When a hospital cannot
fill its beds, fixed costs must be met through higher charges for the beds that are used.
CON regulations originated to regulate the number of beds in hospitals and nursing
homes, and to prevent overbuying of expensive equipment. Mandatory regulation through
health planning agencies determined the most urgent healthcare needs, contributed to
solutions for these needs, and attempted to manage the fluctuations in prices often caused
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by a competitive market. The idea was that new or improved facilities or equipment would
be approved based only on a genuine need in a community. Statutory criteria often were
created to help planning agencies decide what was necessary for a given location. By
reviewing the activities and resources of hospitals, the agencies made judgments about
what needed to be improved. Once need was established, the applicant organization
(corporation, not-for-profit, partnership or public entity) was granted permission to begin a
project.

Development of Federal Regulations
The passage of the Hill-Burton Act marked the beginning of more than forty years
of federally funded health policy planning (Sloan, 1988). It was intended to encourage the
development of hospitals in rural areas because of a perceived shortage of healthcare
facilities after the Depression and World War II (Dunham, 1981). The Act required states
to institute health policy planning in order to receive federal funding for hospital
construction (Sloan, 1988). In addition to producing a plan delineating their healthcare
needs, states were required to inventory existing healthcare facilities and designate a single
agency for health policy planning (Dunham, 1981). Between 1946 and 1971, the HillBurton program provided financial assistance for the construction of new facilities to 60%
of American hospitals (Dunham, 1981).
In 1964, New York became the first state to enact a statute authorizing the state
government to determine whether or not there was a need for a new hospital or nursing
home before it was approved for construction. Four years later the American Hospital
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Association (AHA) expressed an interest in CON regulations, and started a national
campaign for states to generate their own CON regulations.
By 1974, 24 states had enacted CON regulations in response to the passage of
Section 1122 of the 1972 Social Security Amendments (Hyman, 1977). Section 1122
allowed the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to enter into agreements with
states with a ―designated planning agency‖ responsible for determining whether healthcare
facilities could make capital expenditures (Chayer & Sonnenreich, 1978). Mandatory
federal health policy planning did not exist before Section 1122 was passed and only five
(5) states had health policy planning regulations. Similar to CON regulations, Section
1122 forced states to review capital expenditures exceeding $100,000, bed capacity
changes, or ―substantial‖ changes in services (Mendelson & Arnold, 1993). It was much
more comprehensive than existing state CON regulations and covered all major healthcare
institutions (Hyman, 1977). States failing to institute health policy planning programs
would lose their eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. Because Medicare
and Medicaid reimbursement is a significant source of revenue for most healthcare
facilities, healthcare facilities would comply with state CON regulations. ―Two years after
the passage of the ‗1122‘ amendments 37 states had opted to establish an agency for the
purpose of implementing the federal law‖ (Hyman, 1977, p. 31).
The 1972 Amendments also established Professional Standards Review
Organizations (PSRO) to control utilization of services and to review procedures (Ashby,
1984). PSROs preceded Professional Review Organizations (PROs), established in the
mid-1980s to evaluate the reasonableness and necessity of inpatient services provided to
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Medicare patients (Sloan, 1988). Although advocates of PSROs argue that they have
improved the quality of healthcare, the majority of evidence indicates that PSROs were
used primarily to control costs, not to promote quality (Sloan et al., 2001). A 1979 PRSO
Program Evaluation study found that each dollar spent by states on reviewing CON
applications yielded approximately 90 cents in reimbursement savings, a savings-to-cost
ratio of about 0.9-to-1 (Congressional Budget Office, 1988). However, in 1978, data
indicated that only 40% of the costs of PSRO reviews were recouped (Congressional
Budget Office, 1988).
The National Health Planning and Resource Development Act (NHPRDA), enacted
in 1974, pushed CON regulations to the forefront of government healthcare cost
containment efforts. The Act was designed to develop a ―national health planning policy‖
(National Health Planning and Resource Development Act, 1974) in response to the ―lack
of uniformly effective methods of delivering healthcare, the substitution of ambulatory and
intermediate care for inpatient hospital care, and the lack of basic knowledge regarding
personal healthcare and methods for effective use of available services‖ (Rubel, 1976, p.
4). The Act required federal agencies to pass health policy planning guidelines and
establish specific goals, priorities, and success criteria (Sloan, 1988). It prompted states to
enact CON statutes by guaranteeing federal funding for state CON review programs and
conditioning the receipt of certain healthcare funding on enacting CON regulations
(McGinley, 1995). It required all 50 states to have a structure in place that involved the
submission of proposals and obtaining approval from a state health planning agency before
beginning any major capital projects such as building expansions or ordering new high-
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tech devices. Many states implemented CON regulations in part because of the incentive
of receiving CON federal funds. As enacted, this federal oversight plan created
disincentives for noncompliance with the mandated establishment of CON review
programs. In 1974, 23 states had CON statutes, and by 1983, all states except for
Louisiana had a CON law (Louisiana passed CON regulations in 1991).
In the 1980s, however, the deregulation movement set the stage for the elimination
of federal CON regulations. Federal support for CON regulations ended in 1986 with the
repeal of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (Madden,
1999). After the Act‘s repeal, state CON statutes were no longer federally subsidized
(McGinley, 1995). Legislators were concerned that CON regulations ―failed to reduce the
nation‘s aggregate healthcare costs, and it was beginning to produce a detrimental effect in
local communities (McGinley, 1995). Ameringer (2008) states that an ―important reason
why government planning and regulation failed to stem costs concerned weak financial
incentives.‖ He goes on to state that the retrospective payment method established by
Congress in 1965 gave ―physicians carte blanche to maximize fees and medical services.
Physicians enhanced their income by doing more rather than less – by seeing more
patients, by ordering more tests, and by performing more procedures.‖ The federal
mandate was repealed in 1987, and its federal funding was withdrawn.
In the decade that followed, 14 states abolished their CON regulations. However,
36 states currently maintain some form of CON regulation, and even the 14 that repealed
their state CON regulations still retain some mechanisms intended to regulate costs and
duplication of services. Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia also have CON
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regulations. States that have retained CON regulations tend to concentrate their activities
on outpatient facilities and long-term care. This is largely due to the trend toward freestanding, physician-owned facilities that now constitute an increasing segment of the
healthcare market.
While current CON regulations were modeled upon federal legislation, CON
regulation is based on state statutes and rules and regulations which designate an agency or
board to administer the approval process of reviewing CON applications and give authority
to the CON regulatory review board or commission to promulgate regulations specifying
the criteria by which CON applications are evaluated. These criteria must usually be
created in conjunction with the state‘s long-term health plans and goals. In the states
where CON is still regulated, CON statutes constitute the predominant form of state health
planning. State CON regulations generally have two functions: to develop a health plan
that promotes equitable access to healthcare services; and, to review CON applications
submitted by healthcare providers (Morrissey, 2001).

The Theoretical Basis for CON
Roemer and Shain (1959) have argued that hospital beds would be intentionally
filled by providers who induce ill-informed patients into hospital stays; this has been
termed the ―Roemer effect.‖ They stated that an increase in the number of hospital beds
per capita increased hospital utilization rates (Roemer and Shain, 1959), and this was an
important underpinning of efforts to control hospital construction through health planning
(Madden, 1999). Attempts to measure the magnitude of the effect have yielded results
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ranging from no effect to a one-to-one relationship and thus the research has been
inconclusive. One study (Ginsburg & Koretz, 1983) restricted its inquiry to Medicare
patients and used a unique data base, thus avoiding many of the shortcomings of earlier
studies. This study concluded that a 10% increase in hospital beds per capita would
increase hospital utilization by Medicare enrollees by about 4%. While the basis of the
argument might have been valid during the ―cost-plus reimbursement era‖, it is widely
asserted that it has not been demonstrated to be the case today, an era characterized by the
shifting of financial risk to providers (Morrisey, 2001).
In response to rising healthcare costs, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) have transitioned from reimbursing providers on a cost-plus or fee-forservice basis to the prospective payment system (PPS), under which reimbursement is set
before the service is provided (Madden, 1999). CMS originally paid for hospital services
using a ―cost plus‖ reimbursement basis, where hospitals were paid for all their costs and
more. Under this reimbursement system, hospital profits were directly linked to patient
volumes. In 1983, ―cost-plus‖ reimbursement was replaced by a prospective payment
system defined by ―diagnosis-related groups‖ (DRGs) based on the patient‘s primary
diagnosis. Under this reimbursement system, hospitals have the financial risk of providing
services efficiently under a set fee scale for a given diagnosis.
The premise of CON regulations was simple: lower costs by reducing duplication,
The term ―duplication‖ is often called ―excess capacity‖ and it is used in the assertion that
societal costs increase when there are ―too many‖ providers of the same health service
(Madden, 1999). Madden (1999, p 1651) summarized studies of excess capacity saying,
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―Without a clear statement of this standard (e.g., the correct number of hospital beds), we
cannot determine what constitutes too many.‖ The research literature provides no clear
statement (Madden, 1999).

Arguments For and Against CON
Advocates of CON regulations say that healthcare is not a ―typical‖ economic
product. They argue that many ―market forces‖ do not obey the same rules for healthcare
services as they do for other products. In support of this argument, it is often pointed out
that, since most health services (like an x-ray) are ―ordered‖ for patients by physicians,
patients do not ―shop‖ for these services as they do for other commodities. This makes
hospital, lab and other services insensitive to market effects on price, and suggests a
regulatory approach based on public interest.
The American Health Planning Association (AHPA) is the professional group of
state agencies responsible for regulation and planning. They identify three factors that
suggest the need for CON regulations. The primary argument is that CON regulations
limit healthcare spending. CON regulations can promote appropriate competition while
maintaining lower costs for treatment services. The AHPA argues that by controlling
construction and purchasing, state governments can oversee what expenditures are
necessary and where funds will be used most effectively. This helps eliminate projects that
detract attention from more urgent and useful investments and reduces excessive
costs. AHPA also asserts that CON regulations have a valuable influence on the quality of
care. When facilities and equipment are monitored, hospitals and other treatment centers
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can ascertain what sort of services are in demand and how well patients are being taken
care of.
Supporters also contend that the programs distribute care to areas that new medical
centers are likely to ignore. CON regulations are a resource for policymakers. CON
regulations are described as a reliable way to implement planning policies and practices,
and to distribute healthcare to all populations. The CON process can call attention to
underserved areas in need because planners can track and evaluate the requests of
hospitals, doctors and citizens and see which areas need improvement and development.
CON regulations also have been subject to wide criticism. To start, opponents
argue that it is not clear that these state-sponsored programs actually controlled healthcare
costs. For example, by restricting new construction, CON regulations not only reduce
price competition among facilities, but may actually keep prices high. Barriers to new
building are seen as unfair restrictions, sometimes by both existing facilities and by
potential new competitors. There is little compelling proof that overcapacity or duplication
leads to higher charges. In 2004 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department
of Justice both claimed that CON regulations actually contribute to rising prices because
they inhibit competitive markets that should be able to control the costs of care and
guarantee quality and access to treatment and services (FTC & DOJ, 2004).
Some opponents believe that changes in the Medicare payment system (such as
paying hospitals according to Diagnostic Related Groups or DRGs) would obviate the need
for external regulatory controls, because healthcare organizations would be more subject to
market pressures. Some critics have pointed out that the CON regulations are not
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consistently administered. A ―flexible‖ program could allow development, to the dismay
of competitors. A ―restrictive‖ program could limit competition, with the same effect.
Many argued that health facility development should be left to the economics of each
institution, in light of its own market analysis, rather than being subject to political
influence.
Some evidence suggests that lack of competition has paradoxically encouraged
construction and additional spending. Some opponents of CON regulations believe an
open healthcare market, based on quality rather than price, might be the best means of
containing rising costs. Proponents of CON regulations disagree. This debate rests on the
same arguments as many other ―Regulated market‖ vs. ―Open market‖ discussions.
In theory, CON regulations are granted based on objective analysis of community
need, rather than the economic self-interest of any single facility. However, opponents of
CON regulations claim that the programs have not worked this way. They cite cases in
which CON regulations were apparently enacted on the basis of political influence,
institutional prestige or other factors apart from the interests of the community.
Furthermore, it is sometimes a matter of debate what sort of development is actually in the
community‘s interest, with people of good will sharply divided.
A central argument against CON regulatory policy is that by intervening in the
market, natural market forces are disrupted and is significantly anti-competitive (Feldstein,
2005). As a result, CON regulations are often barriers to new market entrants and many
healthcare economists see them as a strong disincentive to reaping the benefits of new
technologies. Porter et al. (1994) states:
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In industry after industry, the underlying dynamic is the same: competition
compels companies to deliver increasing value to customers. The fundamental
driver of this continuous quality improvement and cost reduction is innovation.
Without incentives to sustain innovation in healthcare, short-term cost savings
will soon be overwhelmed by the desire to widen access, the growing health needs
of an aging population, and the unwillingness of Americans to settle for anything
less than the best treatments available. Inevitably, the failure to promote
innovation will lead to lower quality or more rationing of care—two equally
undesirable results. (p. 131)
Furthermore, there is consensus among researchers that competition among
providers drives quality-of-care, patient outcomes, and cost efficiency (Smith-Mello,
2004). According to Madden (1999, p. 1659), ―there is . . . agreement across all
perspectives of [health economics theory] on one issue: the negative consequence of too
much concentration of economic power.‖ Hospitals in more competitive markets have
been demonstrated to have average costs below those of less competitive markets
(Zwanziger & Melnick, 1996). Competition appears to give economic power to patients
and payers by creating choices for consumers and raising quality standards as providers
compete for patient loyalty. When patient choice is diminished, decisions about access,
quality, and beneficial outcomes become the purview of oligopolistic market players who,
as decision makers acting in the absence of healthy competition, are free to ignore patient
demands and needs (Brown et al., 1992).
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CON regulations are an example of a governmental regulatory policy that is often
in conflict with the goals of antitrust enforcement, and have been regularly denounced by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Seeking to preserve competition in healthcare
markets, the FTC has opposed CON regulations in a 2004 joint study with the Department
of Justice (DOJ). The agencies believe that CON regulations are not successful in
containing healthcare costs, and that they pose serious anticompetitive risks that usually
outweigh their purported economic benefits (FTC & DOJ Report, 2004). Market
incumbents can too easily use CON procedures to forestall competitors from entering an
incumbent‘s market. The vast majority of single-specialty hospitals—a new form of
competition that may benefit consumers—have opened in states that do not have CON
regulations.
Two important factors determine the number of hospitals competing in a given
market: economies of scale and barriers to entry. Entry barriers increase the market
power—hence profitability—of those hospitals currently in the market (Feldstein, 2005).
CON regulations restrict the healthcare market by preventing healthcare providers from
choosing the types and amounts of care they will offer – and even whether they may enter
the market at all. Economic theory predicts that providers already in the market will react
to CON regulations in two ways: altering their labor and capital mix, and raising prices
(Saikever & Bice, 1976).
To produce goods, firms employ a mix of capital and labor. CON regulations
restrict capital investments – especially beds – but not labor. Consequently, firms that
want to expand or retain their market shares will shift investment from categories that are
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under intense scrutiny, like enhancing facilities and adding beds, to those that are less
closely monitored by CON regulations, such as labor and perhaps equipment.
By restricting entry and exit, CON regulations grant firms monopoly power. Under
CON regulations, then, healthcare providers are monopolists that will charge higher prices
because they do not face competition from other firms. CON regulations encourage prices
to rise by limiting the amount of certain healthcare services that monopolists may provide
to patients. These caps make services more valuable to consumers at the margin, further
pushing up prices. This effect is especially likely in healthcare, since insurance decreases
the price sensitivity of most consumers. At the same time, though, price increases might
not reach their full potential because managed care firms make great efforts to lower costs.
Although a thorough literature review revealed no studies that examine the association of
CON regulations on pricing, economic theory strongly predicts that such regulations would
raise prices. Capping prices through mandated rate-setting would be the only way to
ensure that prices do not rise under CON regulations.
Another likely effect of monopoly power is that a healthcare provider will have
fewer incentives to improve or maintain efficiency and quality. Kessler and McClellan
(2000) offered some support for this argument. The researchers found that after 1990, high
levels of hospital competition both lowered costs and improved outcomes for Medicare
beneficiaries. In states with CON regulations, the healthcare market is further distorted
because CON regulations do not apply to all healthcare services. Services such as
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which are exempt from CON regulations, are free to
proliferate. Such uneven application of CON regulations gives an advantage – and
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incentive – to firms and individual providers to supply more unregulated services, which
are not necessarily needed more by the community.

Intent and Structure of CON Regulations
The assumption underlying CON regulations is that excess capacity (in the form of
facility overbuilding) directly inflates healthcare prices. When a hospital cannot fill its
beds, fixed costs must be met through higher charges for the beds that are used. Larger
institutions have higher costs, so supporters of CON regulations claim that it makes sense
to limit facilities by building only enough capacity to meet actual needs.
CON statutes were intended to regulate the number of beds in hospitals and nursing
homes, and to prevent overbuying of expensive equipment. Mandatory regulation through
health planning agencies determined the most urgent healthcare needs, contributed to
solutions for these needs, and attempted to manage the price fluctuations that are often
caused by a competitive market. The idea was that new or improved facilities or
equipment would be approved based only on a genuine need in a community. Statutory
criteria often were created to help planning agencies decide what was necessary for a given
location. By reviewing the activities and resources of hospitals, the agencies made
judgments about what needed to be improved. Once such a need was established, the
applicant organization (corporation, not-for-profit, partnership or public entity) was
granted permission to begin a project. These approvals generally are known as
"Certificates of Need."
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CON regulations are now established by state law. CON regulations prohibit
identified health facilities, services or equipment from being initiated, upgraded or
modernized, expanded, relocated or acquired without a certificate from that state
determining that the facility, service or equipment is needed. Criteria for the approval or
denial of a CON application are established by law or regulation as review standards and
include cost, quality and access considerations. Covered facilities, services or equipment,
like review standards, vary from state to state.
The latest data available indicates that 37 states including the District of Columbia
have CON regulations applying to at least one service or medical procedure and 14 states
do not (Appendix 2). Ten CON-regulated states do not include acute care hospitals in their
program, but all 36 include long-term care. The number of services covered by any one
state program varies from 1 to 30 and there are wide variations in how the programs are
administered. Transplant services are covered in 21 states.
Since the inception of CON programs, many changes occurred in healthcare
financing and delivery rendering most of the fiscal benefits expected from CON
obsolete in today‘s market place. A significant change is the shift from cost-based
reimbursement methodologies toward service-based payment methodologies. Many
private healthcare insurance companies as well as large public programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid adopted service based payments methods such as inpatient prospective
payment system, diagnostic related groups, resource utilization groups, outpatient
prospective system, ambulatory payment classification system, and managed care capitation
rates over the last two decades. The trend toward service-based payments reduced
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provider incentives to build excess capacity or take on unneeded capital investment
projects, as they cannot directly recover the cost of their investments. Thus, this concern
does not seem to have validity in today‘s healthcare market as it did 30 years ago.
With the changes in the healthcare environment it is important that CON
regulations are examined for relevancy and usefulness. This study examines specifically
the association of solid organ transplant CON regulations on the number of transplant
centers per state, the volume and the outcomes for heart and kidney transplant centers.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the literature on the association of Certificate of Need (CON)
regulations on healthcare in addition to the literature on volume and quality. Three major
areas of healthcare delivery are discussed here – quality, access, and costs -- in relationship
to CON regulations. An interactive relationship exists among the cost of healthcare,
people‘s ability to obtain needed healthcare services, and the quality of services. This
review of literature focuses on the studies of volume and quality and the influence of CON
regulations since this is the main focus of this study.
The literature on the influence of CON regulations on access, quality and costs is
mixed. Empirical research does not appear to support the claim that CON regulations
reduce healthcare costs. CON regulations have not been found to be effective in
controlling overall per capita healthcare spending because many factors affecting costs
such as labor and physician services are beyond the scope of the CON regulations. Nor
has CON regulations been found to be effective in controlling hospital costs because (a)
not all services are regulated under CON regulations, (b) CON regulations are not always
effective in controlling supply, and (c) when bed supply was controlled, expenditures per
bed have been found to increase (Arnold & Mendelson, 1992; Conover & Sloan, 1998:
Custer, 1997; Delaware Health Commission, 1996; Lanning et al., 1991; Mendelson &
Arnold, 1993; Salkever, 1978).
The empirical evidence on the access impact of CON regulations is limited and
contradictory. In some studies, CON regulations have been found to protect inner city
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facilities and enhance healthcare access while in other studies CON regulations are shown
to have restricted needed services. The effects of access seem to vary by state and by
service. Finally, there appears to be lack of empirical evidence on the rural access effects
of CON regulations (Arnold & Mendelson, 1992; Brown et al., 1992; Delaware Healthcare
Commission, 1996; Hackey, 1993; Kiel, 1993; McGinley, 1995; Mendelson & Arnold,
1993; Rettig, 1992; Sloan, 1988; Weaver, 1995).
Evidence is inconclusive regarding the ability of CON regulations to improve
quality by forcing high utilization of equipment or services even though high utilization
rates have been found to improve outcomes. There is some evidence that CON regulations
protect quality in the home health sector by filtering out unprepared or unqualified
providers. CON regulations effect on preventing for-profit providers from participating
and the resulting effect on quality are mixed. Finally, findings indicate that CON
regulations do not provide an ongoing mechanism for monitoring quality (Arnold &
Mendelson, 1992; Brown et al., 1992; Burling, 1998; Collins & Keane, 1997; Conover &
Sloan, 1998; Delmez et al., 1992; Delaware Healthcare Commission, 1996; Federal Trade
Commission, 1986; Griffiths et al., 1994; Irvin, 1998; Lanning et al., 1991; Luft et al.,
1990).

Access
In theory, CON regulations improve access to healthcare (a) by limiting entry of
new providers who may limit the ability of incumbents to provide unprofitable services,
(b) by restricting expansion of facilities in overbuilt areas leading providers to expand
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services in underserved areas, and (c) by requiring providers to serve all patients needing
care in a particular area.
Sloan and Steinwald (1980) found a 1.4% additional increase in bed supply in the
year prior to CON regulations implementation and attributed this to the anticipatory effects
of CON laws implementation. After CON regulations implementation, providers shifted
investments to those areas not covered by CON regulations, such as hospital equipment.
In addition, empirical analysis of labor inputs indicated that CON regulations tend to
increase labor employment as an unintended, although compensatory effect of CON
regulations (Sloan & Steinwald, 1980). The study observed 1,228 U.S. hospitals from
1969 to 1975, including labor inputs and simultaneous assessment of several concurrent
regulatory programs in an attempt to isolate the effects of CON regulations from those of
other regulatory programs in place (Sloan & Steinwald, 1980).
However, opponents of CON regulations point out that the remaining firms would
be unable to raise prices to monopoly levels because competitors could easily enter the
market. ―Attempts by providers to reduce costs, gain efficiencies of scale, and position
themselves aggressively in the marketplace have results in the formation of vertical
integrated delivery systems of such providers‖ (Montesino, 1996).
Studies suggest that specialty hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) –
which most frequently arise in the absence of CON regulations – have the potential to
drain nonprofit providers‘ financial resources and provide less charity care. The U.S. GAO
(2003) discovered that most specialty hospitals focus on highly profitable services and
often are not located in geographic areas of medical need. Mitchell (2005), who compared
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specialty and general hospitals in Arizona, a state without CON regulations, found
evidence to support the GAO‘s conclusions. She found that physicians with ownership
stakes in specialty hospitals treated higher percentages of profitable cases, less severe
cases, and better-insured patients. Further suggesting that specialty hospitals might harm
access, Gruber (1994) found that less charity care was provided in California after it
abandoned CON regulations.
Other research, however, concludes that the absence of CON regulations do not
necessarily lead to more services, abandonment of cities or charity care, or a proliferation
of for-profit hospitals. Anderson, Heyssel, and Dickler (1993), comparing the presence of
CON regulations in Baltimore and their absence in Minneapolis-St. Paul did not find clear
differences in service offerings. However, a study that compares the effect of CON
regulations on services in cities to that of suburbs would be more useful, since most
supporters of CON regulations are concerned that free exit will leave inner cities bereft of
healthcare as services are shifted to more lucrative suburbs. This question was addressed
qualitatively by Bazzoli, Gerland, and May (2006). They reviewed recent facilities
construction in many markets and concluded that CON regulations do not influence
whether construction occurs in cities or suburbs. Regardless of CON regulations, more
ambitious projects were launched in affluent suburbs than in poor cities.
Shortell et al. (1986) asserted that the provision of charity care would not be
threatened by eliminating CON regulations because the proportion of uncompensated care
does not differ between non- and for-profit hospitals. Another study, though, found that
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those results are not meaningful, because the number of for-profit hospitals is unlikely to
greatly increase upon the removal of CON regulations (Conover & Sloan, 1998).

Costs and Expenditures
The initial driving force for the CON regulations, in addition to the 1974 federal
mandate, was the concern that excess capacity and capital investment contributed to higher
publicly funded healthcare costs, as early 1970s healthcare payments were based on costbased reimbursement methodologies. Under these methodologies, providers were
reimbursed for their capital costs and had incentives to build excess capacity. Since the
inception of CON regulations, many changes have occurred in healthcare payment
methodology, rendering most of the fiscal benefits expected from CON regulations
obsolete in today‘s marketplace. A significant change is the shift from a cost-based
reimbursement methodology to service-based methodologies. Most private healthcare
insurance companies and large public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid have
adopted services- based payment methods such as prospective payment systems, diagnostic
related groups, outpatient prospective payment over the last two decades. The trend
toward service-based payments reduced provider incentives to build excess capacity or
take on unneeded capital investment projects as they cannot directly recover the cost of
their investments.
Salkever and Bice (1979) demonstrated that CON regulations from 1968 to 1972
had no appreciable effect on total hospital investment but did result in a decrease in the rate
of growth in bed supply and an increase in investment in quality enhancing projects.
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Additionally, analyses based on all states combined, from 1968 to 1972, found that CON
regulations applied to a typical state would have reduced the number of inpatient days, a
small increase cost per inpatient days, and a very modest reduction in hospital costs per
capita (Salkever & Bice, 1979). Moreover, no significant savings in hospital costs were
achieved through CON regulations as any savings from lower admission rates and hospital
stays resulting from control over bed growth were approximately offset by higher than
average per diem costs resulting from upgrading the level of care (Salkever & Bice, 1979).
Anderson and Kass (1986) examined the justification for requiring CON approval
before new firms could begin providing home healthcare services. Like studies of the
impact of CON regulations on hospitals, this study found no evidence that CON
regulations contribute to lower costs for the provision of home healthcare services and, if
anything CON regulations are associated with on average two percent higher costs for
firms operating in regulated states (Anderson & Kass, 1986). Moreover, operating under
CON regulations was more costly due to administrative in addition to the seeming lack of
cost containment benefits (Anderson and Kass, 1986).
Noether (1987) reported that CON regulations significantly limit entry into the
hospital market. While for-profit institutions were once subject to more stringent CON
regulations than non-profit institutions, non-profits no longer have this advantage
(Noether, 1987). Studies show that where entry into the market is regulated by CON
regulations, both prices and expenses are higher than in areas without such regulation.
Despite CON regulations‘ function as a potential entry barrier, its primary effect is less
efficient resource utilization which is then passed on in the form of higher prices (Noether,
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1987). Noether estimated that states with CON regulations on average have higher prices
and expenses averaging 1.8 to 2.6% and 1.2 to 2.4% higher, respectively, than those
without. Nor did he find evidence that CON regulations produced the resource savings
they were designed to provide. It concludes that plans and decisions to repeal CON
regulations in some states should, in theory, increase consumer welfare (Noether, 1987).
Sherman (1988) analyzed data from 1983 to 1984 from the ―1984 Annual Survey
of Hospitals‖ conducted by the American Hospital Association, using data from
approximately 6,300 short-term general acute care hospitals. Output costs were measured
by five variables: total number of inpatient days spent in acute care; total number of
inpatient days spent in intensive care; patient days spent in sub-acute care or other
departments; all visits to hospital emergency departments; and, clinic and other outpatient
visits made to hospital (Sherman, 1988).
Results of the study indicated that as states review fewer hospital expenditures,
hospital costs do not increase (Sherman, 1988). Rather, hospital costs are lower in states
that have set higher review thresholds for all types of hospital expenditures. Moreover, it
was estimated that if states were to significantly relax their regulatory constraints by
doubling the thresholds at which hospital expenditures were subject to CON regulations,
total hospital costs would decline by 1.4% (Sherman, 1988). The study posits that the
reason for increased costs despite CON regulations are because CON regulations assume
that by reducing the amount of capital and equipment available to hospitals, the total cost
of resources will decrease (Sherman, 1988).
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Sloan et al. (1988) evaluated several of the arguments made by proponents of CON
regulations. One argument in support of CON regulations was that ―in the absence of
regulation, firms will drop prices so low that most will fail, leaving the market to a
monopolist or a few oligopolists‖ (Sloan et al., 1988). Providers have been shown to
accelerate investments in facilities and equipment in anticipation of the implementation of
CON regulations (Sloan et al., 1988). Such behavior is cited as demonstrating the
willingness of providers to ―play the system.‖ Thus, existing providers support CON
regulations to prevent competition.
A 1992 study by Anderson examined the effect of CON regulations on hospital
capital investment and operating expenditures. Previous studies had found that hospital
capital investments significantly raised operating costs. However, a 1987 assessment of
prior studies found that although current capital expenditures increased future operating
expenditures, it estimated that the overall effect was much less than previously reported
(Anderson, 1992). The study advised, ―As Congress debates whether to incorporate capital
into the Medicare Prospective Payment System, our results suggest that controlling the rate
of increase in operating expenses may only negligibly deter capital expansion by hospital
administrators‖ (Anderson, 1992).
Most evidence suggests that CON regulations do not substantially reduce or contain
healthcare expenditures. Neither CON regulations nor other types of regulation are
associated with lower costs, according to an econometric analysis of 22 years of data by
Antel, Ohfeld, and Becker (1995). As previously discussed, Salkever and Bice‘s early
(1976) study of the financial effects of CON regulations found that these regulations did
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not suppress overall hospital investment but exacerbated the medical arms race. Although
CON regulations slowed bed expansion, they more substantially sped up investment in
new services and technologies, substituting a growth in labor and services for a growth in
beds (Salkever & Bice, 1976). Similarly, Conover and Sloan (1998) found that CON
regulations slightly lowered acute care spending but neither slowed the diffusion of
hospital-based technologies nor reduced total spending. Bazzoli, Gerland, and May (2006)
noted that some markets are developing duplicative services and technologies, despite the
presence of CON regulations.
Feldman‘s 2000 meta-analysis of CON regulations and government market process
concludes that the ―empirical literature on CON regulations is extensive, and virtually
unanimous in its consensus that CON regulations have neither controlled hospital costs nor
restrained service diffusion‖ (Feldman, 2000, p. 245). The studies reviewed by Feldman
indicated that CON regulations have resulted in higher profits for for-profit hospitals, and
have prevented entry of new providers into the market to the benefit of existing providers
(Feldman, 2000). This restriction into the market is described as especially significant
given the increased competitiveness due to the spread of managed care entities. Moreover,
recent studies indicate that CON regulations tend to increase costs, rather than achieve
their designed purpose of controlling costs, with hospitals in states regulated by CON
regulations having costs 20.6% higher than those in states with no CON regulations
(Feldman, 2000).
The empirical literature reviewed in the Feldman meta-analysis also suggests that
CON regulations have not been effective in restricting the diffusion of new technologies,
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including open-heart surgery, renal dialysis programs, and CT scanner (Feldman, 2000).
Case studies from Policy Analysis-Urban Systems (1980), cited by Feldman, suggest this
lack of effectiveness resulted from hospitals being able to avoid CON regulations by
leasing CT scanners, purchasing mobile units, or purchasing units right below CON
regulatory threshold (Feldman, 2000).
In 1998, the Joint Legislative and Audit Review Committee and the Health Policy
Analysis Program of the University of Washington‘s School of Public Health and
Community Medicine conducted a study of the CON Program in Washington State,
examining the effects of CON regulations and its effect on the cost, quality, and
availability of healthcare services, as well as CON regulations‘ effect on charity care and
access to health services in rural areas (State of Washington JLARC, 1999). Results based
on a literature review, interviews and information from healthcare providers and healthcare
economic experts in the state, in addition to the analysis of states that completely or
partially repealed their CON regulations, found strong evidence that CON regulations are
not effective either in controlling healthcare spending or in controlling supply (State of
Washington JLARC, 1999). This study found that while CON regulations can slow the
expansion of some healthcare services, other factors that CON regulations do not control
also affect healthcare costs.
Further, the evidence gathered in this study, regarding the effect of CON
regulations on quality, and the ability of CON regulations to improve quality by
concentrating volume of specialized services is weak and inconclusive, with only some
indirect evidence suggesting that CON regulations may protect quality in home health and
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hospice by keeping out unprepared or unqualified providers, mainly due to the fact that
CON regulations do not provide an ongoing mechanism to monitor quality (State of
Washington JLARC, 1999).
This study found conflicting evidence regarding the effect of CON regulations or
its repeal on access to health services, particularly in rural areas. Although CON
regulations have been used to protect existing facilities in inner cities or to encourage
providers to locate to those areas, CON regulations appear to restrict access by preventing
the development of new facilities (State of Washington JLARC, 1999). In addition, the
relationship between CON regulations and access varies by service and by state, with no
ongoing mechanism to monitor access (State of Washington JLARC, 1999).
Finally, while some states are more likely to grant a CON to facilities offering more
charity care, the CON regulations in Washington and most other states do not include
monitoring for compliance. No studies were identified that measured the effect of CON
regulations on levels of charity care, while the study reported that financial and market
pressures make it increasingly difficult for all types of providers to offer charity care (State
of Washington JLARC, 1999).
The study determined that the available evidence did not support making a
recommendation as to whether Washington should repeal or retain its CON regulations.
However, the study did provide specific options for policy makers depending on their
decision as to the CON regulations‘ future. Should Washington decide to reform the
program, the study suggested reassessing legislative and regulatory goals in relation to new
conditions and needs in healthcare system; establishing policy oversight or an advisory
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board to make CON regulations more responsive to changes in the healthcare system; and
improving data collection to allow for ongoing monitoring and oversight of quality, access,
and community benefits, including charity care (State of Washington JLARC, 1999).
Should the program be repealed, the study suggested identifying policy goals for cost,
quality, access and accountability along with alternative methods of attaining these goals;
strengthening data collection and reporting to monitor the effects of repeal on quality,
access and community benefits; and conducting economic analysis to estimate the effects
of deregulation and to guide the policy changes (State of Washington JLARC, 1999).
An empirical study by Conover and Sloan (1998) examined health spending
between the late 1970s and 1993, including spending prior to and directly after state CON
regulations were repealed, stated:
The major findings about CON regulations can be summarized as follows: first, we
found no surge in expenditures after CON regulations were lifted; second, despite a
statistically significant reduction by mature programs on acute spending per capita,
there was no corresponding reduction in total per capita spending (apparently due
to offsetting expenditures on non-hospital services). We found that mature CON
regulations reduced hospital bed supply per capita population, but could detect no
increase in bed supply following the removal of CON (p. 474).
Furthermore, the study found that established CON regulations increased cost per adjusted
patient day and also cost per admission (Conover & Sloan, 1998).
The only way in which research indicates CON regulations might generate cost
savings is through lowering the number of procedures. Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin, and
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Rosenthal (2006) and Ho (2004) all found that states with CON regulations have lower
coronary procedure rates for patients with cardiac problems. The authors suggested that
this is because fewer providers are certified to perform such procedures, relative to states
without CON regulations. However, the difference in procedure rates is slight; suggesting
both that the effects of supplier-induced demand for these services and the potential benefit
of cost savings is small.
In a 2002 study of CON regulatory policy, hospital financial and utilization data for
states with CON regulations and states without CON regulations were analyzed for the
years 1989, 1994, and 1999 (Cimasi, 2002). The study fell within the parameters of CON
theory, which asserts that the management and implementation of CON regulations on
inpatient care supply should reduce the cost of care. The objectives of the study were to:
(a) describe characteristics of the U.S. healthcare system, stratified by the CON policy; and
(b) compare inpatient costs, utilization, and capital indicators between states with and
without CON regulations.
Case definitions for the 2002 HCC CON Regulations study included: the term
―CON state,‖ which was any state that had acute care CON regulations in effect during the
analysis period years 1989 through 1999; the term ―non-CON state,‖ which was any state
that did not have acute care CON regulations in effect during the analysis period years
1989 through 1999; the term ―included states,‖ defined as the 47 states and the District of
Columbia, whose status related to whether CON regulations were in effect did not change
during the analysis period years 1989 through 1999; and, the term ―excluded states,‖ which
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referred to the states of Indiana, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, which were excluded
because of significant changes to their CON regulations between 1989 and 1999.
The methodology for the 2002 HCC CON study was based on a statistical analysis,
employing a one-way analysis of variation (ANOVA), comparing each of the study
variables, i.e.: beds per 1,000; admissions per 1,000; average length of stay (ALOS);
expenses per admission; expenses per capita; cost per 1,000; total profit margins; average
age of plant; and debt per bed, by state CON law status, across three points in time—1989,
1994, and 1999. Confidence p-values were calculated for each variable for each variable
pair (CON regulations and no CON regulations) for each year. A standard statistical
significance cut-off of .05 was utilized.
Data selected and analyzed for the 2002 HCC CON Study was derived from three
(3) recognized sources, i.e.: (a) Hospital Statistics published by the American Hospital
Association (AHA), which compiles hospital data derived from replies to the AHA Annual
Survey, sent to all AHA-registered and non-registered hospitals in the U.S.; (b) The
Almanac of Hospital Financial and Operating Indicators, published by The Center for
Healthcare Industry Performance Studies (CHIPS), which annually reports the financial
position of the hospital industry; and (c) The Comparative Performance of U.S. Hospitals:
The Sourcebook, published and produced by Healthcare Investment Analysts (HCIA) and
Deloitte & Touche, which presents current and historical information on the financial
performance of the U.S. hospital industry.
Several limitations of the 2002 HCC CON Study were disclosed:
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(a) the complexity of the healthcare economy, subject to the impact of multiple
variables, complicates efforts to isolate CON regulations as the driving variable in
the analysis of health system costs, utilization, or access amid market forces such as
the impact of government policy and managed care on reimbursements; evolving
technology, and, shifting patient population demographics and expectations;
(b) CON is not a ‗Yes/No‘ variable because states subject to CON regulations are
also subject to other significant variations including facilities and services
regulated; CON geographic market definitions; CON review thresholds and
criteria; demographic and epidemiological characteristics; and CON administrative
processes; and,
(c) the accuracy, validity, and efficacy of the study‘s statistical analysis was
dependent upon the accuracy, validity, and scope of the reported data utilized (p.
24).
Among the several conclusions drawn from the 2002 HCC CON Study Analysis,
based on comparing data from states with CON and states with no CON regulations during
the analysis period years of 1989, 1994, and 1999, was that:
(a) the data examined indicated that CON regulations do not reduce beds
per 1,000; admissions per 1,000; ALOS, expenses per admission; or
expenses per capita;
(b) there is no evidence that states with CON regulations have achieved greater
total profit margins at less cost per 1,000;
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(c) there is no statistically significant evidence that states with CON regulations
have achieved a lower average age of land as an indicator of acceleration in new
construction activity or retirement of existing, aging facilities; and
(d) there is statistically significant evidence that states with CON regulations have
higher debit per bed than states without CON regulations in 1999 as an indicator of
increased cost due to debt load. (p. 32)
CON regulations proponents have cited assertions by the ―big three automakers‖,
that the employee healthcare costs for these automobiles are less on states with CON
regulations than in states without CON regulations where they operate (Missouri Health
Facilities Review Committee, 2004). These purported results have been provided in
legislative hearings on CON regulations in Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio (Hawkins, 2004).
Nonetheless, CON regulations proponents have not yet published or otherwise submitted
the underlying empirical data or methodology for peer review (Hawkins, 2004). From the
information that has been made publicly available on the Missouri CON website, these
studies include the following characteristics, some of which have been challenged by CON
regulations opponents. Only eight states are sampled: three of which are states without
CON regulations (Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana) and five states with CON regulations
(Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, Michigan, and New York). The survey data was limited
to healthcare expenses for employees of automakers which may not be representative of
the total healthcare expenses in these states.
As a review of the automakers‘ claims, Health Capital Consultants (HCC)
evaluated a data sample that includes hospital expenses per capita for states with CON
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regulations as compared to states without CON regulations, and also selected states with
CON regulations and states without CON regulations including all of the states included in
the automakers‘ study. The results of the HCC analysis indicated that hospital expenses
per capita for states without CON regulations are considerable less than hospital expenses
per capita for states with CON regulations. Furthermore, hospital expenses per capita for
all of the five (5) states with CON regulations selected in the automakers‘ study, were
higher than in states without CON regulations overall (HCC, 2002).

Volume and Quality
CON regulations are intended to ensure that providers maintain high volume by
limiting the number of service providers. More than 100 studies have established a strong
relationship between higher provider procedure volume and better outcomes (Conover &
Sloan, 1998). Luft, Bunker, and Enthoven conducted the pioneering study noting this link
in 1979. After another decade of research, Luft et al. (1990) reviewed the literature and
concluded that there was a link between volume and quality. Later studies have supported
the hypothesis that provider volume is negatively associated with mortality and other
negative outcomes for a variety of cancer resections (Birkmeyer et al. 2002; Ho, 2004; Ho
et al., 2006; Schrag et al. 2003) and coronary procedures (Birkmeyer et al., 2003; Hannan
et al., 1998). Whether the relationship is stronger for hospital or surgeon volume is
unclear, although Birkmeyer et al. (2003) found that surgeon volume accounts for a
substantial proportion of hospital volume‘s effect on mortality. However, Shahian (2004),
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noted that surgeon data may not be a reliable indicator of quality because, unlike hospitals,
surgeons can choose to operate on less difficult cases.
The literature indicates that the presence of CON regulations influences volume,
but not always in a way that also improves outcomes. Di Sesa et al. (2006) found that
states with CON regulations have higher hospital volumes but not better outcomes for
coronary artery bypass grafting. They used the Society of Thoracic Surgeons‘ (STS)
National Cardiac Surgery Database to examine isolated CABG surgery volume, operative
mortality, and complications for the years 2000 to 2003. The presence of CON regulations
for open heart surgery was ascertained for each state in this study. Results were analyzed
nationally, by state, and by region (West, Northeast, Midwest, South) and were adjusted
for clinical factors and both population density and region with mixed-effects hierarchical
logistic regression models. From 2000 to 2003, 314,710 isolated CABG surgeries were
performed at 294 STS hospitals in states with CON regulations (n=27, including
Washington, DC) and 280,512 procedures at 343 STS hospitals in states without CON
regulations (n=24). Patient clinical characteristics were similar among states with CON
regulations and states without CON regulations. States with CON regulations tended to
have higher population densities and had significantly higher median hospital annual
CABG volumes in each year from 2000 to 2003 (p < 0.005). This difference remained
significant after adjustment for region and population density. Operative mortality was
2.52% for states with CON regulations versus 2.62% for states without CON regulations
(p = 0.32). There was a significant association between CON regulations and operative
mortality in the South. After adjustment for patient risk factors and region, there was a
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marginally significant reduction of mortality risk in states with CON regulations (adjusted
OR 0.92, 95% CI 0.86 to 1.00). However, this difference was not statistically significant
when a revised model accounted for random state effects. Similar volume and outcomes
results were seen when the analysis was repeated with data from Medicare database.
Supporting this finding, Ho (2004) and Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin, and Rosenthal
(2006) concluded that states with CON regulations have higher hospital cardiac procedure
volumes but not better outcomes, compared to states without CON regulations. Ho (2004)
studied data from the AHRQ Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) database to compare
hospital procedure volumes and costs for PTCA and CABG in states with and without
cardiac CON regulations. The NIS contains patient-level clinical and resource use
information and the data was analyzed for the years 1988 to 2000. Regression estimates
were used for the determinants of hospital PTCA and CAGB procedure volume and
mortality. The conclusions for this study suggest that substantial declines in average
hospital PTCA and CABG procedure volume have resulted in states which repealed
cardiac CON regulations. Reductions in average hospital volume associated with the
absence of CON regulations have a detrimental impact on mortality rates for CABG
patients. For the 29,294 patients who received CABG surgeries in states that have
repealed CON regulations in 2000, the results suggest that 29 fewer inpatient deaths could
have been avoided with CON regulations. In addition, the results yield no evidence that
the volume effects associated with CON regulations led to reduced mortality for patients
undergoing PTCA.
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A retrospective cohort study of 1,139,792 Medicare patients aged 68 years and
older with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) who was admitted to 4,587 U.S. hospitals
during 2000 to 2003 was performed by Popescu et al. (2006). Their findings were that
patients in states with CON regulations were less likely to be admitted to hospitals with
coronary revascularization services (321,573 {51.5%] vs. 323,695 [62.8%]; p < .001) or to
undergo revascularization at the admitting hospital (163,120 [26.1%] vs. 163,877 [31.8%];
p < .001) than patients in states without CON regulations but were more likely to undergo
revascularization at a transfer hospital (73,379 [11.7%] vs. 45,907 [8.9%]; p < .001. They
concluded that patients with acute myocardial infarction were less likely to be admitted to
hospitals offering coronary revascularization and to undergo early revascularization in
states with certificate of need regulations. However, differences in the availability and use
of revascularization therapies were not associated with mortality.
Shortell and Hughes (1988) found that states that have CON regulations, ratesetting programs, or high HMO penetration actually have higher mortality, but their study
has not been replicated. They examined the influence of the regulation of hospital rates,
state CON regulations, competition, and hospital ownership on mortality rates among
inpatients receiving care under Medicare. Data were obtained from the records of 214,839
patients who received care in 981 hospitals in 45 states from 1983 to 1984. They found
significant associations between higher mortality rates among inpatients and the stringency
of state programs to review hospital rates (p < 0.05), and the intensity of competition in the
marketplace, as measured by enrollment in health maintenance organizations (p < 0.05).
They found hospitals in the states with the most stringent procedures for reviewing
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applications for certificate of need had ratios of actual to predicted death rates that were 5
to 6% higher than those of hospitals in states with less stringent CON regulations (p <
0.05).
Another study by Ross et al. (2007) was conducted to examine whether rates of
appropriate catheterization after admission for acute myocardial infarction varied between
states with and without CON regulations of cardiac catheterization. Their hypothesis was
that CON regulations would be associated with lower rates of catheterization among
patients with equivocal and weak indications but equal or higher rates among those with
strong indications. This study performed a retrospective analysis of chart-abstracted data
for 137,279 Medicare patients admitted for acute myocardial infarction between 1994 and
1996 at 4,179 US acute-care hospitals. Using 3-level hierarchical generalized linear
modeling adjusted for patient sociodemographic and clinical characteristics and physician
and hospital characteristics, they compared catheterization rates within 60 days of
admission for states (and the District of Columbia) with (n=32) and without (n=19) CON
regulations in the full cohort and stratified by catheterization appropriateness. They found
that CON regulations were associated with a borderline-significant lower rate of
catheterization overall (45.8% versus 46.5%; adjusted risk ratio [RR] 0.91, 95%
confidence interval 0.82 to 1.00, p = 0.06). After stratification by appropriateness, CON
regulations were not associated with a significantly lower rate of catheterization among
68,823 patients with strong indications (49.9% versus 50.3%; adjusted RR 0.94, 95%
confidence interval 0.86 to 1.02, p = 0.17). However, CON regulations were associated
with significantly lower rates of catheterization among 65,077 patients with equivocal

47

indication (45.0% versus 46.0%; adjusted RR 0.88, 95% confidence interval 0.78 to 1.00, p
= 0.05) and among 8,379 patients with weak indications (19.8% versus 21.8%; adjusted
RR 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.71 to 0.98, p = 0.04).
Researchers consistently find that when controlling for volume and case severity,
specialty and for-profit hospitals do not have better outcomes than general hospitals. The
GAO (2003) concluded that specialty hospitals see patients who are less ill, a finding that
has been confirmed by Winter (2003) and Mitchell (2005). Specialty hospitals‘ larger
share of less-severe cases appears to influence their outcome data. In a study of coronary
artery bypass grafting (CABG), Cram, Rosenthal, and Vaughan-Sarrazin (2005) found that
outcomes do not differ between specialty and general hospitals, controlling for volume and
case severity. The ownership of a hospital – another potential difference between general
and specialty hospitals – appears to have no bearing on outcomes, cost, or efficiency
(Shortell & Hughes, 1988; Sloan et al., 2001).
Luft, Bunker and Enthoven (1979) were the first to suggest a relationship between
procedural volume and outcome. Since that time, many studies have supported their
results. However, a consensus about the significance of high volume and its association
with lower in-hospital mortality still does not exist and the use of volume as a ―quality
indicator‖ continues to be debated (Birkmeyer, 2003; Halm et al., 2000). Despite the lack
of agreement, many policymakers and some physicians advocate the use of volume as an
indicator of quality and as the basis for such policies as selective patient referral.
Research by Birkmeyer et al. (2002) was undertaken to be the definitive study of
the relationship between volume and outcome. Using information from the national
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Medicare claims database and the Nationwide Inpatient Sample, they examined the
mortality associated with six types of cardiovascular procedures and eight types of major
cancer resections between 1994 and 1999 (total number of procedures in the sample was
2.5 million). Regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between hospital
volume (total number of procedures performed per year) and mortality (in-hospital or
within 30 days), with adjustments for characteristics of the patients. Mortality decreased
as volume increased for all 14 types of procedures, but the relative importance of volume
varied markedly according to the type of procedure. Absolute differences in adjusted
mortality rates between very-low-volume hospitals and very-high-volume hospitals ranged
from over 12% (for pancreatic resection, 16.3% vs. 3.8 %) to only 0.2% (for carotid
endarterectomy, 1.7% vs. 1.5 %). They concluded that in the absence of other information
about the quality of surgery at the hospitals near them, Medicare patients undergoing
selected cardiovascular or cancer procedures can significantly reduce their risk of operative
death by selecting a high-volume hospital (Birkmeyer et al, 2002).
The Leapfrog Group, a consortium of healthcare purchasers and providers
representing approximately 33 million patients and $56 billion in healthcare revenue, is
perhaps the best-known promoter of volume-based selective referrals (Birkmeyer et al.,
2002). The Leapfrog Initiative plans to use market forces to promote improvement in the
quality of healthcare. One of its initial guidelines calls for selective referral to highvolume hospitals for five invasive procedures, and for high-risk neonatal care. The annual
volume thresholds were set at 500 coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) procedures per
year, 400 coronary angioplasties, 30 abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) repairs, 100
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carotid endarterectomies (CEA), and 7 esophagectomies (Hannan, Popp & Tranmer, 1998).
The Leapfrog Group based these thresholds on expert opinion and a critical review of the
literature. Several of these studies used geographically limited databases with few highvolume institutions and may not be generalizable (Sollano & Moskowitz, 1999; Khuri,
Daley & Henderson, 1999). More importantly, these analyses were not intended to
determine thresholds but were primarily designed to validate the existence of volumeoutcome correlations. Finally, more recent studies of the same populations failed to show
a relationship between volume and mortality for two of these procedures, AAA and
CABG. The Leapfrog Group revised its suggested volume thresholds in April 2003,
removing CEA from the list of procedures and adding major pancreatic resections. In
addition, they altered the thresholds for the remaining three procedures (450 CABG, 50
AAA, and 13 esophagectomies). This amendment illustrates that despite the consistent
evidence of a relationship between volume and outcome in the literature, it is still not clear
how to proceed to policy changes. Although selective referral may be a viable option, it is
still not clear where the threshold should be set and if a single threshold is even reasonable.
The relationship between volume and outcome is likely a proxy for other structural
and process components of care, which more accurately predicts quality than volume
alone. Many of these suggested structural and process characteristics, such as the presence
of house staff or more specialized attending staff, dedicated operating rooms, or better
nurse staffing, are more prevalent in academic institutions. The importance of process
measures has been recognized by the Leapfrog Group, which recently proposed a set of
process measures for each of its index procedures to be used as an adjunct to volume;
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however, until these process measures are better defined and institutions are able to
document their performance based on these indicators, volume will continue to be used in
quality measurement.
Khuri et al. (1998) failed to show a relationship between surgical volume and
outcome using the Veterans Affairs National Surgical Quality Improvement Program
database (VA NSQIP). This large, multi-institutional national database (includes 68,631
operations from 123 institutions between October 1, 1991, and September 30, 1997) was
used to investigate eight common surgical procedures and failed to find a relationship
between volume and outcome for any of them. This study included prospective
assessment of presurgical risk factors, process of care during surgery, and outcomes 30
days after surgery; development of multivariable risk-adjustment models; identification of
high and low outlier facilities by observed-to-expected outcome ratios; and generation of
annual reports of comparative outcomes to all surgical services in the Veterans Health
Administration (VHA).
Thiemann et al. (1999) conducted a retrospective cohort study of the relation
between the number of Medicare patients with myocardial infarction that each hospital in
the study treated (hospital volume) and long-term survival among 98,898 Medicare
patients 65 years of age or older. They used proportional-hazards methods to adjust for
clinical, demographic, and health-system-related variables, including the availability of
invasive procedures, the specialty of the attending physician, and the general area of
residence of the patient (rural, urban, or metropolitan). They concluded that patients with
acute myocardial infarction who are admitted directly to hospitals that have more
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experience treating myocardial infarction, as reflected by their case volume, are more
likely to survive than are patients admitted to low-volume hospitals.
Although Thiemann et al. (1999) reported a significant relation between hospital
volume and mortality in the case of acute myocardial infarction, the findings of another
study (Chen et al. 1999) suggested that the relation between volume and mortality may be
related to differences in the processes of care. Using the same database but not all the
same patients or hospital groupings, Chen at al. (1999) found that one group of highvolume hospitals (those included on the list of ―America‘s Best Hospitals,‖ published
annually by U.S. News & World Report, 1997) had significantly lower rates of 30-day
mortality than did two other groups of hospitals. One of the other groups consisted of
high-volume hospitals that had on-site facilities for cardiac catheterization, angioplasty,
and coronary-artery bypass graft surgery, and the other group was composed of mostly
low-volume hospitals that did not have these facilities. The differences in mortality rates
were no longer significant after adjustment for the higher use of aspirin and beta-blockers
in hospitals listed in ―America‘s Best Hospitals.‖

Summary
CON regulations emerged during 1970s as a response to a federal mandate
introduced by the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (NHPRDA)
and to healthcare cost containment concerns associated with cost-based reimbursement
methodologies. In today‘s environment, none of these original reasons seem to have
validity as they did three decades ago. In 1988, when NHPRDA expired, CON regulations
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were no longer federally mandated. Also, the trend toward service-based payment
methodologies coupled with expansion of managed care significantly mitigated the
original cost containment concerns that existed when cost-based payment methodologies
were being used.
There is limited literature on CON regulations effects on volume and quality. Most
studies conclude that the absence of CON regulations do not necessarily lead to more
services, abandonment of cities or charity care, or to a proliferation of for-profit hospitals.
High procedural volume has been strongly associated with better outcomes but the
literature indicates that the presence of CON regulations impacts volume, but not in a way
that improves outcomes. Lastly, most of the evidence suggests that CON regulations
neither substantially reduce nor contain healthcare expenditures. Solid organ
transplantation is a complex, high-cost treatment that in 2008 was performed over 27,000
times. However, none of the published studies have examined the association of CON
regulation on volumes and outcomes for solid organ transplants.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

Following the overview and development of the Certificate of Need (CON)
regulations and the review of the literature, this study examines the regulation and its
impact on heart and kidney transplant centers. Historically, CON was meant to regulate
cost, quality, and access to healthcare services. The objectives of this study are to
understand the association of CON regulations on number of centers, volume and
outcomes of transplant centers in states with and without solid organ transplant CON
regulations. This chapter provides a detailed account of the study design, hypotheses, and
the study population; it also defines and describes the variable used in this study. As
previously discussed, this study tests the relationships between CON regulation the number
of centers per state, transplant volume and quality indicators (graft and patient failure).
The study assesses the association of solid organ transplant CON regulations using
a clinically-rich database available from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients
(SRTR). The study will answer the question: What is the association of solid organ
transplant CON regulations on the number of centers, the transplant volume and outcomes
for heart and kidney transplant centers?

Data Source
The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) is the unified
transplant network established by Congress under the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA) of 1984 to be operated by a private, non-profit organization under federal
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contract. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) was awarded the first OPTN
contract on September 30, 1986, and has continued to administer the OPTN under contract
with the Health Resources and Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) for more than 20 years and four successive contract renewals.
The OPTN is a public-private partnership that links all of the professionals involved in the
donation and transplantation system. The goals of the OPTN are to:


increase and ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of organ sharing in the
national system of organ allocation.



increase the supply of donated organs available for transplantation.

―As part of the OPTN contract, UNOS has:


established an organ sharing system that maximizes the efficient use of organs
through fair and timely allocation.



established a system for the collection, storage, analysis and publication of data
pertaining to the patient waiting list, organ matching, and transplants.



provided information, consultation and guidance to persons and organizations
concerned with human organ transplantation in order to increase the number of
organs available for transplantation.‖ ( UNOS, 2010)
UNOS members include transplant hospitals, organ procurement organizations and

independent histocompatibility laboratories in the United States, as well as voluntary
health organizations, such as the American Diabetes Association; ethicists and families of
donors; and medical professional and scientific organizations, such as the American
Medical Association. ―Membership means that upon completion of the prescribed
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application process and satisfaction of applicable requirements, the organization or
individual has demonstrated compliance with all applicable UNOS membership criteria.‖
(UNOS, 2010)
Representing the largest group of UNOS membership, transplant centers are the
medical institutions that operate organ transplant programs. As of October 11, 2009, 250
transplant centers in the United States were operating one or more organ transplant
programs. Transplant centers are required to submit data to at the time of recipient
registration include transplant center information, recipient demographics, organ type
transplanted (heart, lung, or heart-lung combination), patient description, pre-transplant
serology, and factors that increase the patient's risk for a poor transplant outcome.
Kidney data collected on the Transplant Recipient Registration Form include
transplant date, patient status (at time of transplant), primary renal diagnosis, pre-transplant
serology, organ preservation description, and surgical information. Additional data
collected as part of the Transplant Recipient Follow-Up Form include patient status (at
time of follow-up), information about organ rejection, immunosuppressive medication,
graft status, cause of graft loss, patient status, and cause of death (OPTN, 2010).
Thoracic data collected at the time of recipient registration include transplant center
information, recipient demographics, organ type transplanted (heart, lung, or heart-lung
combination), patient description, pre-transplant serology, and factors that increase the
patient's risk for a poor transplant outcome. This data is submitted to The Scientific
Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) is a national database of statistics related to
solid organ transplantation (kidney, liver, pancreas, intestine, heart, and lung). The
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Registry covers the full range of transplant activity, from organ donation and waiting list
candidates to transplant recipients and survival statistics. The purpose of the Registry is to
support the development of sound policy, to encourage research on issues of importance to
the transplant community, and to facilitate responsible analysis of transplant programs and
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs).
Data in the Registry are collected by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network (OPTN) from transplant centers and organ procurement organizations (OPOs)
across the country. Transplant centers are medical institutions within the United States
that operate an organ transplant program. The database captures clinical information from
transplant centers. Centers enter patient data using uniform definitions. A series of quality
checks are performed before a site‘s data are aggregated into the national sample. The
SRTR is administered by the Arbor Research Collaborative for Health with the University
of Michigan.

Patient Population
Data from the SRTR for 309 transplant centers (101 heart transplant centers and
208 kidney transplant centers) from 2006 through 2008 will be examined. Volume of
transplants performed per center as well as their risk-adjusted graft failure and patient
deaths will provide the variables of interest.
Information about states‘ CON regulations was obtained from the 2006 and 2008
annual reports published by the National Directory of the American Health Policy
Association.
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Variables
The independent variable for the study is the presence or absence of solid organ
transplantation CON regulations within a state. For transplant-center level analyses, the
outcome variables of interest were graft failure and patient death as measured by the riskadjusted observed to expect graft failure ration and observed to expected patient death ratio
report through SRTR for each transplant center. For state-level analyses, the outcome
variable of interest were the number of transplant centers, the average transplant center
volume and the total number of transplant procedures performed during the study period in
a given state.
Graft failure is reported by SRTR at the 1-month, 1-year, and 3-year reporting
time points for each center, with corresponding rates for the U.S. This study uses the 1year data. For the 1-year statistics, transplants occurring between January 1, 2006 and
December 31, 2008 were included. Statistics reported by SRTR for adults (age 18 and
older) were used. Additional data from the Social Security Death Master File (SSDMF)
and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) were incorporated by SRTR into
the graft survival rates.
Graft failure is defined differently for different organs. For all organs, deaths are
considered to be graft failures. Once the patient has died, it cannot be determined how
long the graft would have functioned had the patient lived. The SSDMF and CMS data are
used in conjunction with OPTN data to identify deaths. In the case of conflicting deaths
dates from various sources, the OPTN death date takes precedence. If there is no OPTN
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death date but conflicting dates from SSDMF and CMS, the SSDMF date takes
precedence.
A graft is considered to have failed when follow-up information indicates that one
of the following occurred prior to the reporting time point: graft failure (except for heart
and liver where retransplant dates are used instead), retransplant, or death. OPTN followup forms are used to identify graft failure and retransplant dates. Transplants that occurred
in the last six months of the accrual period for the 1-year reporting time point are only
followed for six months after transplant because the 1-year follow-up information is not
available in the current OPTN data. The reporting time point for this subset of transplants
is six months after transplantation.
The ―Expected Graft Failure‖ is the fraction of grafts that would be expected to fail
at each reported time point, based on the national experience for patients similar to those at
this center. The national experience was analyzed using data for all grafts at all facilities in
the United States. A Cox proportional hazards regression model for time to graft failure
(Cox, 1972) was fitted to the national data, which yielded the probability of graft failure
for each patient, based upon the characteristics of each patient and the reporting time point.
The expected survival is the average of these computed probabilities. The characteristics
accounted for in these calculations are reported by SRTR in their model description.
Models are fit separately by age group (adult and pediatric) and cohort (1-month/1-year
and 3-year). For kidney and liver transplants, models are also fit separately for living and
deceased donor transplants. The ―Expected Graft Failure‖ for each organ was adjusted for
the patient characteristics as listed in the Risk-Adjustment Models.
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Patient death is reported by SRTR at the 1-month, 1-year, and 3-year reporting
time points for each center, with corresponding rates for the U.S. Only those transplants
that occurred between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008 were eligible for inclusion
in the analyses. Patients who had previously received a transplant of this type, whether this
previous transplant occurred during the accrual period or not, were not included. For this
reason, the eligible procedures for inclusion may be smaller than the transplant count used
in the volume model. Statistics were used for adults (age 18 and older). SRTR used
additional data from the SSDMF CMS for inclusion in the patient death rates.
The SSDMF and CMS data are used in conjunction with OPTN data to determine
whether each patient is alive or dead at the end of the follow-up period. A patient is
counted as having died when OPTN follow-up information, SSDMF data, or CMS data
indicates that a death has occurred prior to the reporting time point. In the case of
conflicting deaths dates from various sources, the OPTN death date takes precedence. If
there is no OPTN death date but conflicting dates from SSDMF and CMS, the SSDMF
date takes precedence. If the patient is not reported to have died in any source, the patient
is assumed to be alive.
The national experience was analyzed using data for all accrued transplants at all
facilities in the United States. A Cox proportional hazards regression model for time to
death (Cox, 1972) was fitted to the national data, which yielded the probability of survival
to the reporting time point for each patient, based upon the characteristics of each patient
and the reporting time point. The expected death is the average of these computed
probabilities. The characteristics accounted for in these calculations are reported by SRTR
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in their model description. Models are fit separately by age group (adult and pediatric) and
cohort (1-month/1-year and 3-year). For kidney and liver transplants, models are also fit
separately for living and deceased donor transplants. The ―Expected Patient Death‖ for
each organ was adjusted for the patient characteristics as listed in the SRTR RiskAdjustment Models. For statistical comparisons, it is appropriate to compare the number of
deaths observed during follow-up (which is shorter than the reporting time point for
censored patients) to the number of deaths that would be expected during follow-up, rather
than by comparison of observed and expected survival rates at the reporting time points.
The ratio of observed to expected deaths compares the entire survival curve up to the
reporting time point to the curve expected for patients with the same characteristics based
on the national experience rather than just the survival at the reporting time point. A ratio
greater than 1.00 indicates that there were more deaths at the center than would have been
expected based on the national experience, while a ratio less than 1.00 indicates that there
were fewer deaths at the center than would have been expected based on the national
experience. For example, a ratio of 1.20 indicates that the death rate at the center was, on
average, 20% higher than the national rate. A ratio of 1.00 indicates that the death rates at
the center are the same as the national death rates.
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Hypotheses
This study will be a non-experimental, descriptive and correlational research
design.
Based on the objective to examine CON regulations on heart and kidney transplant centers,
the following hypotheses are proposed:
1. States with CON regulations for solid organ transplant services will have fewer
transplant centers than states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
2. States with CON regulations for solid organ transplant services will perform more
heart and kidney transplant procedures than states without CON regulation for solid
organ transplant services.
3. States with CON regulations for solid organ transplant services will have better
quality outcomes (graft failures and patient deaths) than states without CON
regulation for solid organ transplant services.
As the healthcare environment has changed over time from cost-based
reimbursement to capitation and fixed fees for service, CON regulations effectiveness
should be critically examined. Heart and kidney transplantation are complex
procedures that have been regulated by CON but never studied for volume differences
or improved outcomes.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter will outline the results of the study of 309 transplant centers during the
years 2006 through 2008. First, a descriptive analysis of the data will be presented. Then
the results of the independent samples t-test and univariate analysis of variance for each
hypothesis will be presented.

Descriptive Analysis – States
Currently 37 states and the District of Columbia (DC) have a CON regulation and
of those 37, 21 have a specific solid organ transplant CON regulation. Fourteen (14) states
have no CON regulation and 30 states have no solid organ transplant CON regulation.

Figure 1. States with CON regulations compared to States with Transplant CON
Regulations
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Table 1. States with CON Regulations and States with Transplant CON Regulations

Organ Transplant CON?

State CON?

Frequency Percent

Frequency Percent
Yes

37

72.5

Yes

21

41.2

No

14

27.5

No

30

58.8

Total

51

100.0

Total

51

100.0

Descriptive Analysis – Transplant Centers
Active transplant centers (performed at least 1 transplant procedure each year for
2006, 2007 and 2008) for adult heart and kidney transplants numbered 309 for the 50
United States including the District of Columbia. The number of transplant centers per
state ranged from 0 to 30 (Table 3). Four states have no transplant centers: Alaska, Idaho,
Montana and Wyoming.

Figure 2. Number of Heart and Kidney Transplant Centers by Transplant CON
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Table 2. Transplant Centers by Transplant CON and Organ
Organ Transplant CON?
Yes
Organ

Heart

Count
% within Organ

Kidney Count
% within Organ
Total

Count
% within Organ

No

Total

42

59

101

41.6%

58.4%

100.0%

84

124

208

40.4%

59.6%

100.0%

126

183

309

40.8%

59.2%

100.0%

In 96 hospitals, both heart and kidney transplant were performed; in 213 hospitals
only one type of transplant was performed – either heart or kidney. For the purpose of this
study, centers are counted separately even when a hospital performs both type of
transplants (heart and kidney). Typically, there are different transplant surgeons and
nursing staffs caring for the different organ types.

Hypothesis # 1 - Transplant Centers Analysis
One purpose of CON regulations is to limit the number of providers or services in
order to prevent duplication of services. The first hypothesis of this study proposes that
states with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services will have fewer heart and
kidney transplant centers than a state without a CON regulation for solid organ transplant
services. The null hypothesis is that there are no differences or more transplant centers in
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states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation than states without a CON regulation
for solid organ transplants.
To test this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of the presence of a solid organ
transplant CON regulation for the state in which the centers are located was used and the
number of transplant centers per state was tested. Table 3 shows the results and as
expected states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had fewer transplant centers
(126 versus 183). A difference in the mean number of transplant centers per state was
identified. States with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had 4.94 fewer transplant
centers than states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 3. Transplant Centers per State
All Transplant
Centers
Number
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

309
13.03
11.00
9.335
1
30
.699
.139
-.929
.276

Transplant Centers
in States with
Transplant CON
Regulation
126
10.10
10.00
5.275
1
20
.573
.216
-.265
.428

Transplant Centers
in States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
15.04
11.00
10.877
1
30
.283
.180
-1.657
.357

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 3 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Histogram Transplant Centers per State

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 4. Figure 4 illustrates that the transformed variable
was normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed
data for transplant centers per state to determine if there was a statistically significant
difference in the mean number of transplant centers in the states with and without a solid
organ transplant CON regulation. Table 5 provides results from the independent t-test and
Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is not equal variance in both groups
(p = .000) and the t (306) = -2.397, p = .017. This analysis found that as hypothesized
states with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services had fewer transplant
centers than those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
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Table 4. Log Transformation Transplant Centers per State
Transplant Centers
All Transplant
in States with
Centers
Transplant CON
Regulation
Number
309
126
Mean of Log
.9847
.9289
Median of Log
1.0413
1.0000
Standard Deviation of Log
.3623
.2891
Minimum of Log
.0000
.0000
Maximum of Log
1.4771
1.3010
Skewness of Log
-.463
-1.297
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.139
.216
Kurtosis of Log
-.222
2.414
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.276
.428

Transplant Centers
in States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
1.0230
1.0414
.4014
.0000
1.4771
-.387
.180
-.988
.357

Figure 4. Histogram Log Transformation Transplant Centers per State
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Table 5. T-Test Log Transformation Transplant Centers per State
Transplant Centers per State
Equal
Equal
variances
variances not
assumed
assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
38.362
Variances
Sig.
.000
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-2.260
-2.397
df
307
306.358
Sig. (2-tailed)
.025
.017
Mean Difference
-.0942
-.0942
Std. Error Difference
.0417
.0393
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.1761
-.1715
Higher -.0122
-.0169

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 6 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates a significant difference
[F (1, 307) = 5.108, p = .025] in the mean number of transplant centers in the states with
and without a solid transplant CON regulation.
Table 6. ANOVA Log Transformation Transplant Centers per State
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Groups

.662

1

.662

Within Groups

39.779

307

.130

Total

40.441

308

Sig.
5.108

.025

The above analysis is consistent with hypothesis that CON regulations control or
restrict the total number of centers. One concern is that this relationship could be an
artifact of the population of the state. If states with a solid organ transplant CON
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regulation are smaller in population size, on average, they may have fewer centers per state
because population needs would be lower.
A first review of the state population size for states with and without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation shows that both groups contain at least some states with large
populations. Table 7 shows that of states with populations over 10 million, there are 4
with a solid organ transplant CON regulation and 4 without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation.
Table 7. States with Average Populations greater than 10,000,000 Residents
State
Average Population Current CON
Active Heart
Active Kidney
Estimate
for Solid
Transplant
Transplant
2006-2008
Organ
Centers
Centers
Transplant
California
36,261,900
No
9
19
Texas
23,837,005
No
9
21
New York
19,415,710
Yes
6
14
Florida
18,263,424
Yes
4
8
Illinois
12,780,127
Yes
5
7
Pennsylvania
12,520,014
No
7
14
Ohio
11,513,794
No
3
8
A better test would control for ―transplant needs‖ in each state in order to evaluate
if access to transplant centers is restricted in states with a solid organ transplant CON
regulation relative to states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. As a rough
proxy for this idea, a test for differences between the numbers of centers per state was
performed by creating a new variable (Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents). This
variable was created using the number of transplant centers per state normalized to the
state average population for 2006 through 2008. Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics
for this new variable for states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
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A difference in the mean number of transplant centers per state was identified but in the
opposite direction once population was taken into account. The mean difference was
0.0132 more centers for states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation than for states
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 8. Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Transplant Centers in
All Transplant
States with
Centers
Transplant CON
Regulation
Number
309
126
Mean
.1262
.1340
Median
.1030
.0993
Standard Deviation
.1013
.1497
Minimum
.0431
.0431
Maximum
.8520
.8520
Skewness
6.034
4.463
Std. Error of Skewness
.139
.216
Kurtosis
40.782
19.171
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.276
.428

Transplant Centers in
States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
.1208
.1259
.0436
.0452
.3131
1.144
.180
3.104
.357

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 8 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Histogram Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 9. Figure 6 illustrates that the transformed variable is
normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data
for transplant centers per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a statistically
significant difference in the mean number of transplant centers per 100,000 residents in
states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 10 provides results
from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is equal
variance in both groups (p = .590) and the t (307) = -.847, p = .398. This analysis found
that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have fewer transplant
centers than those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. So when normalized
by the rough measure of population, the hypothesis is not supported.
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Table 9. Log Transformation Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Transplant Centers
Transplant Centers
All Transplant
in States with
in States without
Centers
Transplant CON
Transplant CON
Regulation
Regulation
Number
309
126
183
Mean of Log
-.9521
-.9627
-.9447
Median of Log
-.9872
-1.0031
-.9000
Standard Deviation of Log
.18360
.21976
.15408
Minimum of Log
-1.37
-1.37
-.34
Maximum of Log
-.07
-.07
-.50
Skewness of Log
1.691
2.573
-.092
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.139
.216
.180
Kurtosis of Log
7.030
8.790
-.075
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.276
.428
.357

Figure 6. Histogram Log Transformation Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
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Table 10. T-Test Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents

Levene‘s Test for Equality of
Variances
t-test for Equality of Means

Transplant Centers per
100,000 Residents
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not
assumed
.291
.590
-.847
-.795
307
207.604
.398
.428
-.01801
-.01801
.02126
.02265

F
Sig.
t
df
Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean Difference
Std. Error Difference
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.05985
Higher .02383

-.06266
.02665

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
This analysis demonstrates [F (1, 307) = .717, p = .398] that there is no significant
difference in the mean number of transplant centers per 100,000 residents in the states with
and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.

Table 11. ANOVA Log Transformation Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups

.024

1

.024

Within Groups

10.358

307

.034

Total

10.382

308

.717

.398
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Type of Transplant
The next step was to see if a significant difference existed between the two types of
organ transplants under study – heart and kidney transplants. Even though the procedures
are both complex surgical procedures, the process of procurement of the organs are quite
different between heart and kidney transplants. Heart transplants are dependent on the
death of a donor in order to have a heart to use in the transplant procedure. Kidneys, on
the other hand, can be procured from deceased donors or from living donors. Because of
the extreme differences in procurement, both were analyzed separately to determine if one
played a larger role or not.
Table 12 shows the descriptive statistics for heart transplant centers and as expected
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had fewer heart transplant centers (42
versus 59). A difference in the mean number of heart transplant centers per state was 4.62.
States with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had, on average, fewer heart transplant
centers than states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.

Table 12. Heart Transplant Centers per State
All Heart Transplant
Centers
Number
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

101
12.91
10.00
9.100
2
30
.792
.240
-.802
.476

Heart Transplant
Centers in States with
Transplant CON
Regulation
42
10.21
10.00
4.941
2
20
.715
.365
.056
.717

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
59
14.83
11.00
10.793
2
30
.351
.311
-1.668
.613

75

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 12 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Histogram Heart Transplant Centers per State

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 13. Figure 8 illustrates that the transformed variable
was normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed
data for heart transplant centers per state to determine if there was a statistically significant
difference in the mean number of heart transplant centers in the states with and without a
solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 14 provides results from the independent ttest and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is not equal variance in both
groups (p = .000) and the t (96.951) = -1.206, p = .231. This analysis found that states
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with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services had no fewer heart transplant
centers than those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.

Table 13. Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per State
Heart Transplant
All Heart
Centers in States
Transplant
with Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
Number
101
42
Mean of Log
.9979
.9552
Median of Log
1.0000
1.0000
Standard Deviation of Log
.3248
.2298
Minimum of Log
.3010
.3010
Maximum of Log
1.4771
1.3010
Skewness of Log
-.093
-.569
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.240
.365
Kurtosis of Log
-.843
.344
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.476
.717

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
59
1.0283
1.0414
.3773
.3010
1.4771
-.171
.311
-1.319
.613

Figure 8. Histogram Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per State
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Table 14. T-Test Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per Sate
Heart Transplant Centers
per State
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
26.281
Variances
Sig.
.000
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-1.116
-1.206
df
99
96.951
Sig. (2-tailed)
.267
.231
Mean Difference
-.0731
-.0731
Std. Error Difference
.0655
.0606
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.2030
-.1933
Higher .0569
.0471

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 15 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 99) = 1.245, p = .267] in the mean number of heart transplant centers in
the states with and without a solid transplant CON regulation.
Table 15. ANOVA Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per State
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Groups

.131

1

.131

Within Groups

10.421

99

.105

Total

10.552

100

Sig.

1.245

.267
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For reasons previously discussed, the data was normalized to population by
creating a new variable: heart transplant centers per 100,000 residents. Table 16 shows the
descriptive statistics for this new variable for states with and without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation. A slight difference in the mean number of heart transplant
centers per 100,000 residents was identified but in the opposite direction once population
was taken into account. The mean difference was 0.006 more centers for states with a
solid organ transplant CON regulation than for states without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation.
Table 16. Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Heart Transplant
All Heart Transplant Centers in States with
Centers
Transplant CON
Regulation
Number
101
42
Mean
.1176
.1211
Median
.1030
.0993
Standard Deviation
.0812
.1189
Minimum
.0431
.0431
Maximum
.8520
.8520
Skewness
7.522
5.923
Std. Error of Skewness
.240
.365
Kurtosis
67.962
37.038
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.476
.717

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
59
.1151
.1185
.0368
.0452
.1784
.107
.311
-1.054
.613

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 20 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Histogram Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 17. Figure 10 illustrates that the transformed variable
was normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed
data for heart transplant centers per state to determine if there was a statistically significant
difference in the mean number of heart transplant centers in the states with and without a
solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 18 provides results from the independent ttest and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is equal variance in both groups
(p = -.434) and the t (99) = -.510, p = .611. This analysis found that states with a CON
regulation for solid organ transplant services had no fewer heart transplant centers than
those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
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Table 17. Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Heart Transplant
Heart Transplant
All Heart
Centers States with
Centers in States
Transplant
Transplant CON
without Transplant
Centers
Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
101
42
59
Mean of Log
-.9698
-.9797
-.9627
Median of Log
-.9871
-1.0030
-.9262
Standard Deviation of Log
.1650
.1866
.1491
Minimum of Log
-1.3655
-1.3655
-1.3449
Maximum of Log
-.0696
-.0696
-.7486
Skewness of Log
1.362
2.751
-.440
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.240
.365
.311
Kurtosis of Log
7.814
13.624
-.539
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.476
.717
.613

Figure 10. Histogram Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
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Table 18. T-Test Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000
Residents
Heart Transplant Centers
per 100,000 Residents
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
.618
Variances
Sig.
.434
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-.510
-.491
df
99
75.709
Sig. (2-tailed)
.611
.625
Mean Difference
-.0170
-.0170
Std. Error Difference
.0334
.0347
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.0834
-.0862
Higher .0493
.0521

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 19 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 99) = .260, p = .611] in the mean number of heart transplant centers in
the states with and without a solid transplant CON regulation.
Table 19. ANOVA Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups

.007

1

.007

Within Groups

2.717

99

.027

Total

2.724

100

.260

.611
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To continue testing the first hypothesis, the explanatory variable of the presence of
a solid organ transplant CON regulation for the state in which the centers are located was
used and the number of kidney transplant centers per state was tested. Table 20 shows the
results and as expected states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had fewer
kidney transplant centers (84 versus 124). A difference in the mean number of kidney
transplant centers per state was identified. States with a solid organ transplant CON
regulation had on the average 5.11 fewer kidney transplant centers than states without a
solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 20. Kidney Transplant Centers per State
All Kidney
Transplant Centers
Number
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

208
13.08
11.00
9.468
1
30
.662
.169
-.978
.336

Kidney Transplant
Centers in States
with Transplant
CON Regulation
84
10.04
9.50
5.463
1
20
.535
.263
-.354
.520

Kidney Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
124
15.15
11.00
10.959
1
30
.255
.217
-1.669
.431

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 20 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 11.
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Figure 11. Histogram Kidney Transplant Centers per State

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 21. Figure 12 illustrates that the transformed variable
was normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed
data for kidney transplant centers per state to determine if there was a statistically
significant difference in the mean number of kidney transplant centers in the states with
and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 22 provides results from the
independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is not equal variance
in both groups (p = .000) and the t (203.144) = -2.071, p = .040. This analysis found that
as hypothesized states with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services had fewer
kidney transplant centers than those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
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Table 21. Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per State
Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Transplant
with Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
Mean of Log
.9782
.9157
Median of Log
1.0414
.9771
Standard Deviation of Log
.3798
.3151
Minimum of Log
.0000
.0000
Maximum of Log
1.4771
1.3010
Skewness of Log
-.558
-1.354
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.169
.263
Kurtosis of Log
-.153
2.203
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.336
.520

Kidney Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
124
1.0206
1.0414
.4139
.0000
1.4771
-.462
.217
-.909
.431

Figure 12. Histogram Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per State

85

Table 22. T-Test Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per State
Kidney Transplant Centers
per State
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
18.858
Variances
Sig.
.000
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-1.967
-2.071
df
206
203.144
Sig. (2-tailed)
.051
.040
Mean Difference
-.1048
-.1048
Std. Error Difference
.0533
.0506
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.2099
-.2047
Higher -.0002
-.0050

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 23 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates a significant difference
[F (1, 206) = 3.870, p = .051] in the mean number of kidney transplant centers in the states
with and without a solid transplant CON regulation.
Table 23. ANOVA Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per State
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Groups
.551
1
.551
3.870
Within Groups

29.311

206

Total

29.862

207

Sig.
.051

.142
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For reasons previously discussed, the data was normalized to population by
creating a new variable: kidney transplant centers per 100,000 residents. Table 24 shows
the descriptive statistics for this new variable for states with and without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation. A difference in the mean number of kidney transplant centers
per 100,000 residents was identified but in the opposite direction once population was
taken into account. The mean difference was 0.0169 more centers for states with a solid
organ transplant CON regulation than for states without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation.
Table 24. Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Transplant
with Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
Mean
.1304
.1404
Median
.1030
.0993
Standard Deviation
.1096
.1631
Minimum
.0431
.0431
Maximum
.8520
.8520
Skewness
5.585
4.067
Std. Error of Skewness
.169
.263
Kurtosis
34.428
15.647
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.336
.520

Kidney Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
124
.1235
.1259
.0463
.0452
.3131
1.324
.217
3.428
.431

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 24 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Histogram Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 25. Figure 14 illustrates that the transformed variable
was normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed
data for kidney transplant centers per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a
statistically significant difference in the mean number of kidney transplant centers in the
states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 26 provides results
from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is equal
variance in both groups (p = .257) and the t (206) = -.665, p = .507. This analysis found
that states with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services did not have fewer
kidney transplant centers per 100,000 residents than those without a solid organ transplant
CON regulation.
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Table 25. Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Kidney Transplant Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant Centers
with Transplant
without Transplant
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
124
Mean of Log
-.9435
-.9542
-.9362
Median of Log
-.9872
-1.003
-.8999
Standard Deviation of Log
.1917
.2352
.1562
Minimum of Log
-1.3655
-1.3655
-1.3449
Maximum of Log
-.0696
-.0696
-.5043
Skewness of Log
1.764
2.483
.031
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.169
.263
.217
Kurtosis of Log
6.655
7.584
.037
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.336
.520
.431

Figure 14. Histogram Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000
Residents
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Table 26. T-Test Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000
Residents
Kidney Transplant Centers
per 100,000 Residents
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
1.290
Variances
Sig.
.257
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-.665
-.617
df
206
132.080
Sig. (2-tailed)
.507
.538
Mean Difference
-.0180
-.0180
Std. Error Difference
.0271
.0292
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.0715
-.0759
Higher .0354
.0398

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 27 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 206) = .443, p = .507] in the mean number of kidney transplant centers
per 100,000 residents in the states with and without a solid transplant CON regulation.

Table 27. ANOVA Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000
Residents
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups

.016

1

.016

Within Groups

7.594

206

.037

Total

7.611

207

.443

.507
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The number of transplant centers per state were statistically lower (p = 0.17) in
states with a solid organ transplant CON, as expected. Of the 308 transplant centers
studied, 126 centers were in states with solid organ transplant CON regulations while 183
were in states without solid organ transplant CON regulations (see Table 2). In summary,
for heart and kidney transplant centers together, the number of transplant centers per state
was impacted by the presence of a solid organ transplant CON regulation. The hypothesis
is supported in that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation in place have fewer
transplant centers than states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
When the type of transplant center (heart or kidney) was examined separately, only
the number of kidney transplant centers per state remained statistically significant for states
with a solid organ transplant CON in place. The number of heart transplant centers per
state with and without solid organ transplant CON regulations were not found to be
statistically different.
In an attempt to account for the differences in population between states, a different
variable was created and tested (Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents); no
significance is found between states with and without CON regulations for solid organ
transplants using this measure.

Hypothesis #2: Transplant Volume Analysis
CON regulations were also intended to ensure improved quality and clinical
proficiency by limiting the number of healthcare facilities performing complex medical
procedures and thus increasing the volume of procedures performed at approved facilities.
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The second hypothesis of this study is that transplant center in states with a solid organ
transplant CON regulation will perform more heart and kidney transplant procedures than
transplant centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. The null
hypothesis is that there is no difference in the number of heart and kidney transplant
procedures performed by transplant centers in states with or without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation.
To test this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of the presence of a solid organ
transplant CON regulation for the state was used and the total number of transplant
procedures performed by every center in the state was tested. Table 28 shows the results
and as expected transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation
performed on the average more transplants (185 versus 170). A difference in the mean
number of transplant procedures was identified. Transplant centers in states with a solid
organ transplant CON regulation performed 15.4 more transplant procedures than
transplant centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 28. Transplant Volume per Center
All Transplant
Centers
Number
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

309
175.94
116.00
179.080
4
1,008
1.917
.139
4.051
.276

Transplant Centers in
States with
Transplant CON
Regulation
126
185.06
130.00
185.614
4
867
1.728
.216
2.686
.428

Transplant Centers
in States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
169.66
107.00
174.676
4
1,008
2.080
.180
5.380
.357
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 28 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Histogram Transplant Volume per Center

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 29. Figure 16 illustrates that the transformed variable
was normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed
data for transplant volume per center to determine if there was a statistically significant
difference in the mean number of procedures performed by transplant centers in states with
and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 30 provides results from the
independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is equal variance in
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both groups (p = .708) and the t (307) = .565, p = .572. This analysis found that transplant
centers in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not perform
a significantly different number of transplant procedures. This does not support the
hypostasis and the null hypothesis is accepted.
Table 29. Log Transformation Transplant Volume per Center
Transplant Center
All Transplant
in States with
Centers
Transplant CON
Regulation
Number
309
126
Mean of Log
2.0293
2.0474
Median of Log
2.0645
2.1139
Standard Deviation of Log
.46578
.47699
Minimum of Log
.60
.60
Maximum of Log
3.00
2.93
Skewness of Log
-.356
-.413
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.139
.216
Kurtosis of Log
-.102
-.161
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.276
.428

Transplant Center
in States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
2.0169
2.0294
.45880
.60
3.00
-.324
.180
-.015
.357

Figure 16. Histogram Log Transformation Transplant Volume per Center
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Table 30. T-Test Log Transformation Transplant Volume per Center
Transplant Volume per
Center
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
.141
Variances
Sig.
.708
t-test for Equality of Means
t
.565
.561
df
307
261.967
Sig. (2-tailed)
.572
.575
Mean Difference
.03050
.03050
Std. Error Difference
.05398
.05437
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.07571
-.07655
Higher .13672
.13756

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 31 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 307) = .319, p = .572] in the mean number of transplant procedures
performed by transplant centers in states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.
Table 31. ANOVA Log Transformation Transplant Volume per Center
Sum of Squares
Between Groups

df

Mean Square

.069

1

.069

Within Groups

66.751

307

.217

Total

66.820

308

F

Sig.
.319

.572
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The above analysis does not support the hypothesis that CON regulations increase
volume per center by restricting the number of facilities that perform procedures. As with
the first hypothesis, one concern is the differences in state populations. As a rough proxy
for this idea, a test for differences between the state volumes was performed by creating a
new variable (Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents). This variable was created using
the number of transplant procedures performed in the state normalized to the state average
population for 2006 through 2008. Table 32 shows the descriptive statistics for this new
variable for states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. A difference
in the mean volume of transplants performed per state was identified. The mean difference
was 2.0764 more transplants were performed per 100,000 residents in states with a solid
organ transplant CON regulation than in states without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation.
Table 32. Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Transplant Centers
All Transplant
in States with
Centers
Transplant CON
Regulation
Number
309
126
Mean
20.0228
21.2525
Median
18.2773
18.5641
Standard Deviation
10.6749
15.0714
Minimum
3.8163
7.9510
Maximum
93.2142
93.2142
Skewness
5.235
4.381
Std. Error of Skewness
.139
.216
Kurtosis
33.733
18.766
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.276
.428

Transplant Centers
in States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
19.1761
17.3902
5.9219
3.8163
31.9843
.400
.180
-.105
.357
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 32 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 17.
Figure 17. Histogram Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 33. Figure 18 illustrates that the transformed variable
is normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data
for transplant volume per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a statistically
significant difference in the mean number of transplants performed per 100,000 residents
in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 34 provides
results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is
equal variance in both groups (p = .347) and the t (307) = 1.187, p = .236. This analysis
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found that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not perform more
transplant procedures per 100,000 residents than those without a solid organ transplant
CON regulation. So when normalized by the rough measure of population, the hypothesis
continues to be not supported.
Table 33. Log Transformation Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Transplant Center
Transplant Center
All Transplant
in States with
in States without
Centers
Transplant CON
Transplant CON
Regulation
Regulation
Number
309
126
183
Mean of Log
1.2691
1.2817
1.2605
Median of Log
1.2619
1.2687
1.2403
Standard Deviation of Log
.15410
.16612
.14508
Minimum of Log
.58
.90
.58
Maximum of Log
1.97
1.97
1.50
Skewness of Log
.897
2.558
-.853
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.139
.216
.180
Kurtosis of Log
6.896
9.825
2.421
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.276
.428
.357

Figure 18. Histogram Log Transformation Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
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Table 34. T-Test Log Transformation Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Transplant Volume per
100,000 Residents
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not
assumed
Levene‘s test for Equality of
F
.887
Variances
Sig.
.347
t-test for Equality of Means
t
1.187
1.157
df
307
244.460
Sig. (2-tailed)
.236
.248
Mean Difference
.02115
.02115
Std. Error Difference
.01783
.01828
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.01393
-.01485
Higher .05623
.05715

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 35 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 307) = 1.408, p = .236] in the mean number of transplant procedures per
100,000 residents performed in the states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.

Table 35. ANOVA Log Transformation Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups

.033

1

.033

Within Groups

7.281

307

.024

Total

7.314

308

1.408

.236
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Type of Transplant
The next step, as with the first hypothesis, was to see if a significant difference
existed between the two types of organ transplants under study – heart and kidney
transplants.

Table 36 shows the descriptive statistics for heart transplant volume for

transplant centers in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation performed on the
average fewer heart transplant procedures (56.79 versus 58.63). A difference in the mean
number of transplant procedures was identified. Transplant centers in states with a solid
organ transplant CON regulation performed 1.84 fewer heart transplant procedures than
transplant centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.

Table 36. Heart Transplant Volume per Center
All Heart Transplant
Centers
Number
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

101
57.86
44.00
49.139
4
281
2.314
.240
6.855
.476

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
with Transplant
CON Regulation
42
56.79
42.50
49.314
8
281
2.652
.365
9.773
.717

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
59
58.63
44.00
49.424
4
268
2.141
.311
5.637
.613

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
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and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 36 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 19.
Figure 19. Histogram Heart Transplant Volume per Center

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 37. Figure 20 illustrates that the transformed variable
was normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed
data for heart transplant volume per center to determine if there was a statistically
significant difference in the mean number of heart transplant procedures performed by
transplant centers in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 38 provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of
Variances. There is equal variance in both groups (p = .964) and the t (99) = -.022, p =
.983. This analysis found that transplant centers in states with and without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation did not perform a significantly different number of heart
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transplant procedures. This does not support the hypothesis and the null hypothesis is
accepted.
Table 37. Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per Center
Heart Transplant
All Heart
Centers in States
Transplant
with Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
Number
101
42
Mean of Log
1.6323
1.6314
Median of Log
1.6435
1.6269
Standard Deviation of Log
.3512
.3314
Minimum of Log
.60
.90
Maximum of Log
2.45
2.45
Skewness of Log
-.378
-.004
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.240
.365
Kurtosis of Log
.553
-.003
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.476
.717

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
59
1.6329
1.6435
.3675
.60
2.43
-.576
.311
.872
.613

Figure 20. Histogram Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per Center
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Table 38. T-Test Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per Center
Heart Transplant Volume
per Center
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
.002
Variances
Sig.
.964
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-.022
-.022
df
99
93.535
Sig. (2-tailed)
.983
.982
Mean Difference
-.0015
-.0015
Std. Error Difference
.0712
.0700
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.1429
-.1406
Higher .13987
.1375

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 39 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 99) = .000, p = .983.] in the mean number of transplant procedures
performed by heart transplant centers in states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.
Table 39. ANOVA Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per Center
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Groups

.000

1

.000

Within Groups

12.338

99

.125

Total

12.338

100

Sig.

.000

.983
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The above analysis is not consistent with the hypothesis that CON regulations
increases volume per center by restricting the number of facilities that perform those
procedures. As with the first hypothesis, one concern is the differences in population per
state. As a rough proxy for this idea, a test for differences between the state volumes was
performed by creating a new variable (Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents).
This variable was created using the number of heart transplant procedures performed by
transplant centers in the state normalized to the state average population for 2006 through
2008. Table 40 shows the descriptive statistics for this new variable for states with and
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. A difference in the mean volume of
heart transplants performed per state was identified. The mean difference was 0.4333
more heart transplants were performed per 100,000 residents for states with a solid organ
transplant CON regulation than for states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 40. Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Heart Transplant
All Heart Transplant
Centers in States
Centers
with Transplant
CON Regulation
Number
101
42
Mean
19.9316
20.1847
Median
18.5288
18.5995
Standard Deviation
8.9143
12.0013
Minimum
7.6378
10.7180
Maximum
93.2142
93.2142
Skewness
5.697
5.723
Std. Error of Skewness
.240
.365
Kurtosis
45.740
35.522
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.476
.717

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
59
19.7514
17.7288
5.9258
7.6378
31.9843
.508
.311
-.383
.613
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 36 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 21.
Figure 21. Histogram Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 41. Figure 22 illustrates that the transformed variable
is normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data
for heart transplant volume per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a statistically
significant difference in the mean number of heart transplants performed per 100,000
residents in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 42
provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.
There is equal variance in both groups (p = .163) and the t (99) = -.071, p = .944. This
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analysis found that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not perform
more heart transplant procedures than those without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation. So when normalized by the rough measure of population, the hypothesis
continues to not be supported.
Table 41. Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
All Heart
Transplant Centers
Number
Mean of Log
Median of Log
Standard Deviation of Log
Minimum of Log
Maximum of Log
Skewness of Log
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
Kurtosis of Log
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log

101
1.2753
1.2678
.1346
.88
1.97
1.094
.240
6.546
.476

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
with Transplant
CON Regulation
42
1.2742
1.2695
.1385
1.03
1.97
2.866
.365
15.467
.717

Heart Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
59
1.2761
1.2487
.1329
88
1.50
-.270
.311
.254
.613

Figure 22. Histogram Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000
Residents
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Table 42. T-Test Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000
Residents
Heart Transplant Volume
per 100,000 Residents
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not
assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
1.974
Variances
Sig.
.163
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-.071
-.070
df
99
86.223
Sig. (2-tailed)
.944
.944
Mean Difference
-.0019
-.0019
Std. Error Difference
.0273
.0275
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.0561
-.0566
Higher .0522
.0527

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 43 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 99) = .005, p = .944] in the mean number of heart transplant procedures
per 100,000 residents performed in the states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.
Table 43. ANOVA Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups
.000
1
.000
.005
.944
Within Groups

1.812

99

Total

1.812

100

.018
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To continue testing the second hypothesis, the explanatory variable of the presence
of a solid organ transplant CON regulation for the state in which the centers are located
was used and the number of kidney transplant procedures performed by transplant centers
was tested. Table 44 shows the results and, as expected, transplant centers in states with a
solid organ transplant CON regulation performed on the average more kidney transplant
procedures (249 versus 222). A difference in the mean number of kidney transplant
procedures was identified. Transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON
regulation performed 26.72 more kidney transplant procedures than transplant centers in
states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 44. Kidney Transplant Volume per Center
All Kidney
Transplant Centers
Number
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

208
233.27
170.00
190.905
4
1,008
1.582
.169
2.566
.336

Kidney Transplant
Centers in States
with Transplant
CON Regulation
84
249.20
170.50
195.436
4
857
1.392
.263
1.339
.520

Kidney Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
124
222.48
169.00
187.800
12
1,008
1.751
.217
3.762
.431

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 44 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 23.
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Figure 23. Histogram Kidney Transplant Volume per Center

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 45. Figure 24 illustrates that the transformed variable
was normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed
data for kidney transplant volume per center to determine if there was a statistically
significant difference in the mean number of procedures performed in centers located in
states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 46 provides results
from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is equal
variance in both groups (p = .551) and the t (206) = 1.024 , p = .307. This analysis found
that kidney transplant centers in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation did not perform a significantly different number of kidney transplant
procedures. This does not support the hypothesis and the null hypothesis is accepted.
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Table 45. Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per Center
Kidney Transplant
Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant
with Transplant
without Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
124
Mean of Log
1.2661
1.2854
1.2531
Median of Log
1.2619
1.2678
1.2403
Standard Deviation of Log
.1629
.1790
.1504
Minimum of Log
.58
.90
.58
Maximum of Log
1.97
1.97
1.50
Skewness of Log
.855
2.437
-1.018
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.169
.263
.217
Kurtosis of Log
6.793
8.469
2.896
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.336
.520
.431

Figure 24. Histogram Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per Center
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Table 46. T-Test Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per Center
Kidney Transplant Volume
per Center
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
.356
Variances
Sig.
.551
t-test for Equality of Means
t
1.024
1.015
df
206
172.828
Sig. (2-tailed)
.307
.312
Mean Difference
.0558
.0558
Std. Error Difference
.0545
.0550
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.0516
-.0527
Higher .1633
.1644

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 47 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 206) = 1.048, p = .307] in the mean number of kidney transplant
procedures performed by kidney transplant centers in states with and without a solid
transplant CON regulation.

Table 47. ANOVA Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per Center
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups

.156

1

.156

Within Groups

30.675

206

.149

Total

30.831

207

1.048

.307
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The above analysis is not consistent with hypothesis that CON regulations improve
volume by restricting the number of facilities that perform procedures. As with the
previous tests, one concern is the state‘s population. As a rough proxy for this idea, a test
for differences between the state volumes was performed by creating a new variable
(Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents). This variable was created using the
number of kidney transplant procedures performed in the state normalized to the state
average population for 2006 through 2008. Table 48 shows the descriptive statistics for
this new variable for states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. A
difference in the mean volume of kidney transplants performed per state was identified.
The mean difference was 2.884 more kidney transplants were performed per 100,000
residents for states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation than for states without a
solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 48. Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Transplant Centers
with Transplant
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
Mean
20.0670
21.7864
Median
18.2773
18.5288
Standard Deviation
11.4524
16.4340
Minimum
3.8163
7.9510
Maximum
93.2142
93.2142
Skewness
5.038
4.009
Std. Error of Skewness
.169
.263
Kurtosis
30.208
15.403
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.336
.520

Kidney Transplant
Centers in States
without Transplant
CON Regulation
124
18.9024
17.3902
5.9243
3.8163
31.9843
.360
.217
.036
.431
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 48 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 25.
Figure 25. Histogram Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents

Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting
descriptive statistics shown in Table 49. Figure 26 illustrates that the transformed variable
is normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data
for kidney transplant volume per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a statistically
significant difference in the mean number of kidney transplants performed per 100,000
residents in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 50
provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.
There is equal variance in both groups (p = .778) and the t (206) = 1.407, p = .161. This
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analysis found that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not perform
more kidney transplant procedures per 100,000 residents than those without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation. So when normalized by the rough measure of population, the
hypothesis continues to not be supported.

Table 49. Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Kidney Transplant Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant Centers
with Transplant
without Transplant
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
124
Mean of Log
1.2661
1.2854
1.2531
Median of Log
1.2619
1.2678
1.2403
Standard Deviation of Log
.1629
.1790
.1504
Minimum of Log
.58
.90
.58
Maximum of Log
1.97
1.97
1.50
Skewness of Log
.855
2.437
-1.018
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.169
.263
.217
Kurtosis of Log
6.793
8.469
2.896
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.336
.520
.431
Figure 26. Histogram Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000
Residents
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Table 50. T-Test Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000
Residents
Kidney Transplant Volume
per 100,000 Residents
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not
assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
.080
Variances
Sig.
.778
t-test for Equality of Means
t
1.407
1.361
df
206
157.155
Sig. (2-tailed)
.161
.175
Mean Difference
.0323
.0323
Std. Error Difference
.0229
.0237
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.0129
-.0146
Higher .0776
.0792

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 51 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 206 ) = 1.980, p = .161] in the mean number of kidney transplant
procedures per 100,000 residents performed in the states with and without a solid
transplant CON regulation.
Table 51. ANOVA Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000
Residents
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups

.052

1

.052

Within Groups

5.444

206

.026

Total

5.496

207

1.980

.161
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No statistical differences were found in the transplant center volume between states
with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Even though the number of
centers was fewer for states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation, the volume per
center did not prove to be higher for centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON
regulations. This requires that the null hypothesis be accepted. Even though CON
regulations were established to increase volume by limiting providers that does not prove
correct for heart and kidney transplant center volume. Differences in volume may be
affected by other factors such as supply of organs for transplantation. The demand for
solid organ transplantation, as measured by the number of registrants on the waiting list on
December 31st of each year, increased by 250 percent from 1995 to 2005. However, the
number of transplants performed grew only by 52 percent over the same period (UNOS,
2010). This disparity between utilization and potential demand could be due to the limited
organ supply rather than the capacity of transplant centers.
As with the first hypothesis, another variable was created in an attempt to account
for the differences in population between states. There was no difference in transplants per
100,000 residents between states with and without a solid organ transplant CON
regulations.
Heart and kidney transplant center volumes were examined separately. There was
no difference found in transplant center volume in states with and without solid organ
transplant CON regulations.
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Analysis - Hypothesis #3
The third hypothesis tests whether the presence of a solid organ transplant CON
regulation is associated with lower graft failures and mortality. It is has been stated
previously that the intent of CON was to restrict the number of healthcare providers,
leading to higher procedural volume per center. Higher procedural volume has been
associated with lower mortality rates in previous studies cited in this literature review
(Hannan et al, 1989; Begg et al., 1998). The third hypothesis states that there fewer graft
failures and patient deaths in transplant centers that reside in states with a solid organ
transplant CON regulation. The null hypothesis is that there is not a relationship between a
solid organ transplant CON regulation and graft failures or patient deaths for that
transplant center. For organ transplantation, two outcomes are used – the failure of the
transplanted organ and/or the patient‘s death.
To test this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ transplant CON
regulation for the state where the centers resides was used and the ratios for the observed to
expected (O/E) graft failures and patient deaths were tested. Table 52 shows descriptive
statistics for observed to expected ratio for graft failures. As expected, states with a solid
organ transplant CON regulation had a lower observed to expected ratio for graft failures
(1.0471 versus 1.1972). A difference in the mean observed to expected ratio for graft
failures was identified. Centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had
a 0.15 lower observed to expected ratio than states without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation.
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Table 52. Ratio of O/E Graft Failures
All Transplant
Centers
Number
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

309
1.1360
1.0200
.82565
0.00
8.64
4.035
.139
30.030
.276

Transplant Centers
in States with
Transplant CON
Regulation
126
1.0471
.9250
.76948
0.00
7.11
4.095
.216
30.137
.428

Transplant Centers
in States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
1.1972
1.0400
.85892
0.00
8.64
4.038
.180
30.501
.357

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 52 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 27.
Figure 27. Histogram Ratio of O/E Graft Failures
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Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive
statistics shown in Table 53. Figure 28 illustrates that the transformed variable was
normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to
expected ratio of transplant centers in the states with and without a solid organ transplant
CON regulation. Table 54 provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test
for Equality of Variances. There is equal variance in both groups (p = .715) and the
t (307) = -1.841, p = .067. This analysis found transplant centers in states with a solid
organ transplant CON regulation did not have a lower observed to expected ratio for graft
failures than centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. The
direction of effects on quality was as expected on all tests, although the magnitude of
effects did not reach statistical significance using a two-tailed test at the .05 level,
suggesting that the magnitude of difference may be due to chance.
Table 53. Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures
All Transplant
Centers
Number
Mean of Log
Median of Log
Standard Deviation of Log
Minimum of Log
Maximum of Log
Skewness of Log
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
Kurtosis of Log
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log

309
1.1178
1.1053
.21287
.69
2.36
1.268
.139
5.377
.276

Transplant Centers
in States with
Transplant CON
Regulation
126
1.0910
1.0733
.20516
.69
2.21
1.260
.216
6.138
.428

Transplant Centers
in States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
1.1362
1.1119
.21665
.69
2.36
1.286
.180
5.195
.357
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Figure 28. Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures.

Table 54. T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures
Ratio Observed to Expected
Graft Failures
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
.133
Variances
Sig.
.715
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-1.841
-1.860
df
307
278.058
Sig. (2-tailed)
.067
.064
Mean Difference
-.04520
-.04520
Std. Error Difference
.02455
.02430
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.09350
-.09304
Higher .00310
.00264

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 55 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
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difference [F (1, 307) = 3.390, p = .067] in the mean ratio of observed to expected graft
failures for transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.
Table 55. ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Groups

.152

1

.152

Within Groups

13.804

307

.045

Total

13.956

308

Sig.

3.390

.067

Type of Transplant
To continue testing this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ
transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers resides was used and the ratio for
the observed to expected (O/E) graft failures by transplanted organ were tested. Table 56
shows descriptive statistics for observed to expected ratio for graft failures for heart
transplants. As expected, states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a lower
observed to expected ratio for graft failures (.9752 versus 1.2824). A difference in the
mean observed to expected ratio for graft failures was identified. States with a solid organ
transplant CON regulation had a 0.3072 lower observed to expected ratio than states
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
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Table 56. Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart Transplant Centers
Heart Transplant
Heart Transplant
All Heart
Centers in States
Center in States
Transplant
with Transplant
without Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
101
42
59
Mean
1.1547
.9752
1.2824
Median
.9900
.8600
1.0500
Standard Deviation
1.0097
.6374
1.1960
Minimum
.00
.00
.00
Maximum
8.64
2.68
8.64
Skewness
4.288
.6375
4.208
Std. Error of Skewness
.240
.644
.311
Kurtosis
29.649
.365
24.608
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.476
.120
.613

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 56 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 29.
Figure 29. Histogram Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart Transplant Centers
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Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive
statistics shown in Table 57. Figure 30 illustrates that the transformed variable was
normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to
expected ratio of heart transplant centers in the states with and without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation. Table 58 provides results from the independent t-test and
Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is not equal variance in both groups
(p = .542.) and the t (99) = -1.590, p = .115. This analysis found heart transplant centers in
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have a statistically significant
lower observed to expected ratio for graft failures than centers in states without a solid
organ transplant CON regulation. The hypothesis #3 is not supported since there is no
statistically significant difference in the observed to expected ratio for graft failures.
Table 57. Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart Transplant
Centers
Heart Transplant
Heart Transplant
All Heart
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant Centers
with Transplant
without Transplant
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
101
42
59
Mean of Log
1.1145
1.0686
1.1472
Median of Log
1.0953
1.0508
1.1151
Standard Deviation of Log
.2467
.2101
.2667
Minimum of Log
.69
.69
.69
Maximum of Log
2.36
1.54
2.36
Skewness of Log
1.343
.152
1.664
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.240
.365
.311
Kurtosis of Log
5.529
-.372
6.435
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.476
.717
.613
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Figure 30. Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart
Transplant Centers

Table 58. T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart
Transplant Centers
Ratio Observed to Expected
Graft Failures
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
.374
Variances
Sig.
.542
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-1.590
-1.655
df
99
97.930
Sig. (2-tailed)
.115
.101
Mean Difference
-.0786
-.0786
Std. Error Difference
.0494
.0475
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.1767
-.1729
Higher .0195
.0156
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As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any significant differences between the means. Table 59
shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant difference
[F (1, 99) = 2.528, p = .115] in the mean ratio of observed to expected graft failures for
heart transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON regulation.
Table 59. ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Groups

.152

1

.152

Within Groups

5.935

99

.060

Total

6.087

100

Sig.

2.528

.115

To continue testing this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ
transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers resides was used and the ratios
for the observed to expect graft failures and patient deaths were tested for kidney
transplants. Table 60 shows descriptive statistics for observed to expected ratio for graft
failures. As expected, states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a lower
observed to expected ratio for graft failures (1.0831 versus 1.1567). A difference in the
mean observed to expected ratio for graft failures was identified. States with a solid organ
transplant CON regulation had on the average a .0736 lower observed ratio than states
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
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Table 60. Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Kidney Transplant Centers
Kidney Transplant
Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant
with Transplant
without Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
124
Mean
1.1270
1.0831
1.1567
Median
1.0200
1.0050
1.0350
Standard Deviation
.7222
.8289
.6418
Minimum
.00
.00
.00
Maximum
7.11
7.11
3.69
Skewness
3.362
4.777
1.319
Std. Error of Skewness
.169
.263
.217
Kurtosis
22.786
33.561
2.410
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.336
.520
.431

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 60 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 31.
Figure 31. Histogram Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Kidney Transplant Centers
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Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive
statistics shown in Table 61. Figure 32 illustrates that the transformed variable was
normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to
expected ratio of kidney transplant centers in the states with and without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation. Table 62 provides results from the independent t-test and
Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is equal variance in both groups
(p = .949) and the t (206) = -1.044, p = .298. This analysis found kidney transplant centers
in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have a lower observed to
expected ratio for graft failures than centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation. The hypothesis #3 is not supported since there is no statistically significant
difference in the observed to expected ratio for graft failures.
Table 61. Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Ratio Graft Failures for Kidney
Transplant Centers
Kidney Transplant Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant Centers
with Transplant
without Transplant
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
124
Mean of Log
1.1194
1.1023
1.1310
Median of Log
1.1053
1.1003
1.1102
Standard Deviation of Log
.1949
.2030
.1892
Minimum of Log
.69
.69
.69
Maximum of Log
2.21
2.21
1.74
Skewness of Log
1.176
1.903
.632
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.169
.263
.217
Kurtosis of Log
4.598
9.746
.843
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.336
.520
.431
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Figure 32. Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failure for Kidney
Transplant Centers

Table 62. T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Kidney
Transplant Centers
Ratio Observed to Expected
Graft Failure
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
.004
Variances
Sig.
.949
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-1.044
-1.030
df
206
169.797
Sig. (2-tailed)
.298
.304
Mean Difference
-.0287
-.0287
Std. Error Difference
.0275
.0279
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.0830
-.0838
Higher .0255
.0263
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As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 63 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 206) = 1.091, p = .298] in the mean ratio of observed to expected graft
failures for kidney transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.
Table 63. ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Kidney
Transplant Centers
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups
.041
1
.041
1.091
.298
Within Groups

7.827

206

Total

7.868

207

.038

The second part of the test for quality is patient deaths (mortality). If CON meets
its intention, centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation would have
fewer observed to expected patient deaths. To test this portion of the hypothesis, the
explanatory variable of transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers resides
was used and the observed to expected ratio for patient deaths was tested. Table 64 shows
descriptive statistics for observed to expected ratio for patient deaths. As expected, states
with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a lower observed to expected ratio for
patient deaths (1.0326 versus 1.1831). A difference in the mean observed to expected ratio
for graft failures was identified. States with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a
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0.15 lower observed to expected ratio than states without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation.
Table 64. Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths
All Transplant
Centers
Number
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

309
1.1217
.9300
.95335
0.00
8.35
3.241
.139
18.409
.276

Transplant Centers
in States with
Transplant CON
Regulation
126
1.0326
.9050
.68707
0.00
3.91
1.031
.216
2.309
.428

Transplant Centers
in States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
1.1831
.9600
1.09753
0.00
8.35
3.335
.180
16.590
.357

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 64 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 33.
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Figure 33. Histogram Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths

Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive
statistics shown in Table 65. Figure 34 illustrates that the transformed variable was
normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to
expected ratio of patient deaths in the states with and without a solid organ transplant CON
regulation. Table 66 provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for
Equality of Variances. There is equal variance in both groups (p =.160) and the t (307) = 1.068, p = .287. This analysis found transplant centers in states with a solid organ
transplant CON regulation did not have a lower observed to expected ratio for patient
deaths than centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Hypothesis
#3 continues to not be supported since there is no statistically significant difference in the
observed to expected ratio for patient deaths.
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Table 65. Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths
Transplants Center
All Transplant
in States with
Centers
Transplant CON
Regulation
Number
309
126
Mean
1.1038
1.0855
Median
1.0750
1.0664
Standard Deviation
.25056
.21803
Minimum
.69
.69
Maximum
2.34
1.78
Skewness
1.035
.209
Std. Error of Skewness
.139
.216
Kurtosis
3.262
.286
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.276
.428

Transplant Center in
States without
Transplant CON
Regulation
183
1.1164
1.0852
.27056
.69
2.34
1.273
.180
3.681
.357

Figure 34. Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths
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Table 66. T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of Observed to Expected Patient Deaths
Ratio of Observed to
Expected Patient Deaths
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not
assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
1.982
Variances
Sig.
.160
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-1.068
-1.110
df
307
299.416
Sig. (2-tailed)
.287
.268
Mean Difference
-.03096
-.03096
Std. Error Difference
.02900
.02788
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.08802
-.08582
Higher .02611
.02391

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 67 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 307) = 1.140, p = .287] in the mean ratio of observed to expected patient
deaths for transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.

Table 67. ANOVA Log Transformation of Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Groups

.072

1

.072

Within Groups

19.265

307

.063

Total

19.337

308

1.140

Sig.
.287
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To continue testing this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ
transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers reside was used and the ratio for
the observed to expected (O/E) patient deaths by transplanted organ were tested. Table 68
shows descriptive statistics for observed to expected ratio for patient deaths for heart
transplants. As expected, heart transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant
CON regulation had a lower observed to expected ratio for patient deaths (.9695 versus
1.278). A difference in the mean observed to expected ratio for patient deaths was
identified. Transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a
.3086 lower observed to expected ratio for patient deaths than states without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation.
Table 68. Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart Transplant Centers
Heart Transplant
Heart Transplant
All Heart
Centers in States
Center in States
Transplant
with Transplant
without Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
101
42
59
Mean
1.1498
.9695
1.2781
Median
.9000
.8650
1.0900
Standard Deviation
1.0145
.6649
1.1924
Minimum
.00
.00
.00
Maximum
8.35
2.97
8.35
Skewness
3.868
.798
3.842
Std. Error of Skewness
.240
.365
.311
Kurtosis
24.781
.873
21.053
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.476
.717
.613

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
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and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 68 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 35.

Figure 35. Histogram Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart Transplant Centers

Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive
statistics shown in Table 69. Figure 36 illustrates that the transformed variable was
normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to
expected ratio of heart transplant centers in the states with and without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation. Table 70 provides results from the independent t-test and
Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is not equal variance in both groups
(p = .239) and the t (99) = -1.517, p = .133. This analysis found heart transplant centers in
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have a statistically significant
lower observed to expected ratio for patient deaths than centers in states without a solid
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organ transplant CON regulation. Hypothesis #3 is not supported since there is no
difference in the observed to expected ratio for patient deaths.

Table 69. Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart Transplant
Centers
Heart Transplant
Heart Transplant
All Heart
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant Centers
with Transplant
without Transplant
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
101
42
59
Mean of Log
1.1115
1.0650
1.1445
Median of Log
1.0647
1.0526
1.1282
Standard Deviation of Log
.2533
.2179
.2727
Minimum of Log
.69
.69
.69
Maximum of Log
2.34
1.60
2.34
Skewness of Log
1.239
.175
1.538
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.240
.365
.311
Kurtosis of Log
4.543
-.055
5.252
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.476
.717
.613

Figure 36. Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart
Transplant Centers
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Table 70. T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart
Transplant Centers
Ratio Observed to Expected
Patient Deaths
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
1.403
Variances
Sig.
.239
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-1.517
-1.659
df
99
94.288
Sig. (2-tailed)
.133
.101
Mean Difference
-.3086
-.3086
Std. Error Difference
.2035
.1861
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.7124
-.6780
Higher .0952
.0608

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 71 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 99) = 2.457, p = .120] in the mean ratio of observed to expected patient
deaths for heart transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.
Table 71. ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Groups
.155
1
.155
2.457
Within Groups

6.262

99

Total

6.417

100

Sig.
.120

.063
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To continue testing this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ
transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers resides was used and the ratios
for the observed to expected patient deaths was tested for kidney transplants. Table 72
shows descriptive statistics for observed to expected ratio for patient deaths. As expected,
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a lower observed to expected ratio
for patient deaths (1.0642 versus 1.1379). A difference in the mean observed to expected
ratio for patient deaths was identified. Kidney transplant centers in states with a solid
organ transplant CON regulation had on the average a .0737 lower observed ratio than
kidney transplant centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
Table 72. Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney Transplant Centers
Kidney Transplant
Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant
with Transplant
without Transplant
Centers
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
124
Mean
1.1081
1.0642
1.1379
Median
.9450
1.0550
.8950
Standard Deviation
.9244
.6996
1.0515
Minimum
.00
.00
.00
Maximum
7.32
3.91
7.32
Skewness
2.852
1.137
3.010
Std. Error of Skewness
.169
.263
.217
Kurtosis
14.312
2.949
13.619
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.336
.520
.431

In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held. The skewness
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 72 indicate that the measure was not normally
distributed. This is illustrated in Figure 37.
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Figure 37. Histogram Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney Transplant Centers

Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive
statistics shown in Table 73. Figure 38 illustrates that the transformed variable was
normally distributed. An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to
expected ratio of patient deaths for kidney transplant centers in the states with and without
a solid organ transplant CON regulation. Table 74 provides results from the independent ttest and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances. There is equal variance in both groups
(p = .123) and the t (206) =-.564, p = .574. This analysis found kidney transplant centers
in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have a lower observed to
expected ratio for patient deaths than centers in states without a solid organ transplant
CON regulation. Hypothesis #3 is not supported since there is no difference in the
observed to expected ratio for patient deaths.
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Table 73. Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Ratio Patient Deaths for Kidney
Transplant Centers
Kidney Transplant Kidney Transplant
All Kidney
Centers in States
Centers in States
Transplant Centers
with Transplant
without Transplant
CON Regulation
CON Regulation
Number
208
84
124
Mean of Log
1.1001
1.0957
1.1030
Median of Log
1.0801
1.1168
1.0630
Standard Deviation of Log
.2497
.2186
.2696
Minimum of Log
.69
.69
.69
Maximum of Log
2.23
1.78
2.23
Skewness of Log
.941
.229
1.174
Std. Error of Skewness of Log
.169
.263
.217
Kurtosis of Log
2.722
.521
3.129
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log
.336
.520
.431

Figure 38. Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney
Transplant Centers
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Table 74. T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney
Transplant Centers
Ratio Observed to Expected
Patient Deaths
Equal
Equal
variances
variances
assumed
not assumed
Levene‘s Test for Equality of
F
2.393
Variances
Sig.
.123
t-test for Equality of Means
t
-.564
-.607
df
206
205.950
Sig. (2-tailed)
.574
.544
Mean Difference
-.0737
-.0737
Std. Error Difference
.1308
.1214
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower -.3317
-.3131
Higher .1842
.1657

As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.
Table 75 shows the results of that test. This analysis demonstrates no significant
difference [F (1, 206) = .043, p = .836] in the mean ratio of observed to expected patient
deaths for kidney transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON
regulation.
Table 75. ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney
Transplant Centers
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Between Groups
.003
1
.003
.043
.836
Within Groups

12.908

206

Total

12.911

207

.063
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Graft and patient survival after transplant are used as measures of quality for this
study. Both graft failures and patient deaths showed somewhat better outcomes per center
in states with solid organ transplant CON regulations compared to those without solid
organ transplant regulations but these outcomes were not found to be statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. When heart and kidney outcomes were examined separately,
the relationship between solid organ transplant CON states and quality of outcomes was
stronger for heart transplants (p = .115 than it was for kidney transplants (p = .133). The
direction of effects on quality was as expected on all tests, although the magnitude of
effects did not reach statistical significance using a two-tailed test at the .05 level,
suggesting that the magnitude of difference may be due to chance. .

Summary of Analysis
One of the oldest forms of governmental health regulations is represented by state
certificate of need programs. One of the original purposes of CON regulations were to
concentrate expensive healthcare services within a limited number of institutions by
requiring prior approval before these services can be offered (DiSesa et al, 2008). These
programs have been applied to services such as solid organ transplantation. Such CON
laws affecting transplantation are in effect in 21 states. The purpose of this study was to
assess the association of state CON regulations using clinical data available from the
SRTR.
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The first hypothesis supports one of the original intents of CON to restrict
providers. The presence of a solid organ transplant CON regulation restricted the number
of transplant centers in that state. This study shows, as expected, that in states with a solid
organ transplant CON regulation in place there are fewer transplant centers than states
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. The difference was statistically
significant at the .05 level. When studied separately, this pattern held for kidney transplant
centers but not for heart transplant centers. There were fewer kidney transplant centers in
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation than for states without a solid organ
transplant CON regulation. For heart transplant centers, there was no statistically
significant difference in the number of centers in states with and without solid organ
transplant CON regulations. A possible explanation for the lack of statistical significance
for heart transplant centers is that the time to transplant of a harvested heart is significantly
less (4 to 6 hours for hearts compared to 24 hours for kidneys. This difference may
account for more heart transplant centers. (A summary of the statistical differences for
each test conducted is shown in Appendix 3).
When a new variable was created and tested in order to account for differences in
population size per state (Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents), no significance is
found between states with and without CON regulations for solid organ transplants. This
pattern held for both heart and kidney centers when studies separately. There was no
difference in the number of transplant centers per 100,000 residents between states with
and without solid organ transplant CON regulations. This new variable was only a rough
attempt to explain differences in need for solid organ transplants per state. It did not take
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into account other factors that may impact the number of centers per state such as risk
factors of the population (obesity, cigarette smoking, diabetes) and market characteristics
(e.g., percent uninsured, per capita personal income, proximity to bordering state centers)..
The second hypothesis tests whether the presence of a solid organ transplant CON
regulation is associated with higher procedural volumes for transplant centers. As
previously stated, one of the original intents of CON laws were to reduce duplication of
services which would lead to fewer facilities performing more procedures. This intent was
not supported in the current study. The study found that the volume of transplants per
center was not significantly higher in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation.
This remained the case when the specific organs were studied separately. Neither heart nor
kidney transplants volumes per center were statistically significantly different in states
with and without solid organ transplant CON regulations. This pattern held for the
transplant volume per 100,000 residents for heart and kidney transplants combined and
separated. Thus, the second hypothesis was rejected.
One possible explanation for this outcome is the lack of availability of organs for
transplantation. In spite of improvements in graft and patient survival rates, the number of
available organs for transplants continues to lag far behind the need. The lack of organ
donation has been cited as a major limiting factor in transplantation (Cameron & Forsythe,
2009). Thus, tests of procedural volume per center may need to account for the availability
of organs for transplant.
The third hypothesis looked at the quality of patient outcomes. Past studies have
found a strong association between quality of outcomes and center volume. Thus, CON
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laws intended to increase volume may also affect outcome quality. Although the
transplant volume was not found to be statistically significant between states with and
without solid organ transplant CON regulations, graft failures and patient deaths were both
lower for states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation; however these differences
did not reach statistical significance at the 0.05 level.. When studied separately, it appears
that the heart transplant centers performed better than the kidney transplant centers for both
graft failures and patient deaths. However, differences between outcomes in centers
operating with CON regulations and those without was not statistically significant at the
.05 level for either kidney or heart transplants. Thus, the third hypothesis was not
supported.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this study was to determine if the original intent of Certificate of
Need (CON) regulations are still being met when applied to specific, complex surgical
procedures like heart and kidney transplantation. The study question was:
What is the association of solid organ transplant CON regulations on the number of
transplant centers per state, the transplant volumes and the quality outcomes of the
transplant centers?
CON regulations, as previously outlined, is a regulatory program, administered by states,
that requires providers to obtain approval before establishing certain services, such as solid
organ transplant services. Eventually CON regulation were seen as a means to control
healthcare costs and improve quality of care in part by limiting the number of facilities
providing complex medical care. One original intent of CON was ―to control costs by
regulating major capital expenditures and changes in healthcare services capacity.‖
(Chayet & Sonnenreich, 1978). As presented in the literature review for this study, most
evidence suggests that CON regulations do not substantially reduce or contain healthcare
costs. For this reasons, an analysis of costs for heart and kidney transplant services was
not part of this study. This analysis represents the first evaluation of the potential impact
of CON regulation on transplant centers volume and outcomes.
The first hypothesis, states with CON regulations for solid organ transplant services
will have fewer transplant centers than states without solid organ transplant CON
regulations was found to be significant at the 0.5 level. Using clinically-rich data for heart
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and kidney transplant procedures that took place between 2006 and 2008, this study found
that the number of transplant centers per state were lower, as expected, for states with
CON regulations. However, there was no significant difference in the volume of
transplants performed per center in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation and
those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. The second hypothesis was found
to not be significant at the 0.5 level. The quality transplant outcomes (the third hypothesis)
for centers in states with and without solid organ transplant CON regulations showed a
weak tendency to better outcomes for states with CON regulations than those without CON
regulations, particularly for heart transplants, but this was not a statistically significant
difference..
The importance of the current findings is that while solid organ transplant
regulations may restrict the number of transplant centers in a state it has no impact of the
volume of transplants performed at these centers or the quality outcomes. This finding
differs from previous findings in the published studies on volume and quality.
Luft et al (1970) reported that the number of procedures performed at a hospital and
mortality rates for many surgical procedures were inversely related. Since then, this
relation has been documented many times (Halm & Chassin, 2000). For example, in
studies of the Medicare population, high-volume centers were associated with significantly
lower odds of perioperative mortality, ranging from 12% for carotid endarterectomy to
80% for pancreatic resection (Birkmeyer et al, 2002). Several possible explanations may
be offered for the no volume increase for transplant centers in this study. First, unlike the
Medicare analysis, the current analysis used clinical data from the SRTR rather than
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relying upon claims data or other administrative data sources. The ability to perform
detailed risk adjustment using clinical data has been reported to reduce the measured effect
of volume on outcome in other studies (Halm et al, 2002). Second, the subset of American
hospitals where transplantation is performed is small and select. In general, these hospitals
must demonstrate skilled anesthesia, radiology, and intensive care capabilities in order to
establish a transplant program (Pronovost et al, 2002). Many of the process variables that
contribute to volume differences across a more diverse group of hospitals performing less
scrutinized and regulated surgical procedures may not vary to the same degree among
transplant centers. Third, transplant centers are subject to a legislatively mandated review
process, administered by a government contractor, which is designed to ensure high quality
care. Center performance that is significantly worse than expected is flagged for audit,
review, and remediation.
Organ transplantation outcomes reflect the influence of many factors: patient and
donor selection, case mix, timeliness of donor availability, operative technique, and
postoperative medical management and immunosuppression which any one could explain
the reason differences in outcomes and the acceptance of the null hypotheses in this study.
The SRTR database used in this study provides clinical and outcome information
that is not available in administrative databases and provides risk-adjusted outcomes data.
This is a difference from analysis of data derived from administrative sources such as CMS
MedPAR. The SRTR database has the advantages of years of peer-reviewed development,
refinement, and validation of its risk models, as well as national scope of representation.
Unlike other databases, the SRTR database is not voluntary. Any transplant center
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performing transplants is required to submit data in order to participate in United Network
of Organ Sharing (UNOS).

Limitations of Study
The results in this study should be interpreted in the context of the following
limitations. The associations, or lack of associations, between CON regulations and
transplant services in this study can suggest, but cannot prove a causal effect of CON on
the delivery of transplant care. It is possible that factors not accounted for in this study
may also be important in understanding the relationship between CON regulations and
volume. These factors may include managed care penetration; regional physician practice
variation; efforts to report outcomes data to hospitals, clinicians, third-party payers, and
the public; ownership of facility as well as organization characteristics; and differences in
population and physician density. The degree to which CON status is related to these
factors has not been study or established for heart and kidney transplant programs.
A more specific analysis of population would add a level of analysis. This study
used the population of the state as a rough attempt to explain differences in need for solid
organ transplants per state. Organ supply and organ demand vary by geographic locations
and organ procurement organizations (UNOS, 2010). Residents of a state are not bound to
receive transplants only within their own state. In many cases, due to proximity, physician
referral or patient preference, a patient may receive their transplant outside of the state they
reside.
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The epidemiologic planning model was not employed in this research to analyze
the population at risk for heart disease or end-stage renal disease. This model is a process
to ―define, measure, and forecast the community served and its needs‖ (Griffith & White,
2007) and could have offered additional insight into the populations served by the
transplant centers studies. If there is a higher concentration of disease that leads to the
need of transplantation in a particular state or region, one would expect differences in the
number of centers and the volume of transplants performed at those centers. The present
study does not consider an evaluation of costs, an important component of the value
equation (DiSesa et al, 2006). Although charge data is available for hospitals cost
information is not readily available. The use of the SRTR data merged with a cost
analysis, if it were available, would address the value question.
The differences in the administration of CON regulation state to state also suggest
limitation to this study. There is likely heterogeneity in the character of CON regulations
for transplant services across individual states, which may lead to differences in the scope
and stringency of regulation (Vaughan-Sarrazin, 2002). Furthermore, states without CON
regulations may have other types of healthcare regulatory mechanisms, such as licensure
that impacts transplant services.

Future Research
While this study added to the knowledge related to the association of CON
programs and transplantation, it also leaves more questions to be addressed in future
research. For CON and transplant center outcomes, continued data analysis using the
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SRTR database would provide interesting study. This study used only 3 years of data but
expanding that to more years might provide additional insight as well as expanding the
outcomes to 3-month and 3 year instead of just the 1year used in this study.
This study lacked information on the prevalence of diabetes, hypertension, cardiac
disease, and end-stage renal disease, all of which may influence the need for heart and
kidney transplantation. Future research should take these factors into consideration in
analyzing the volume at transplant centers.
States with solid organ transplant CON programs may differ in their enforcement,
and states without solid organ transplant CON programs may regulate transplant
procedures through other means. The study of the differences in use of CON or other
means of regulation could offer significant insight.

Implications of Study
Despite these limitations, the current study has several important implications for
healthcare research and policy. Currently, efforts are under way to concentrate surgical
procedures with significant volume-outcome effects to large-volume centers (Birkmeyer et
al., 2003). The adoption of such a policy for heart and kidney transplantation would not be
straightforward even if it were desirable, particularly in the case of deceased donor
transplantation. As with HLA matching, the benefit of high-volume center performance
must be carefully weighed against the increased risk of graft loss associated with the
increased cold ischemia time which would likely accompany increased regionalization of
transplant services (Mitropoulos et al., 2005). Furthermore, the frequent follow-up visits
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necessary after transplantation might prove to be an added hardship if patients were forced
to travel great distances. Because patients may be more compliant with follow-up visits if
appointments are convenient, compliance may also be an important determinant of
outcome.
As previously noted, the volume-outcome relationship appears to be particularly
important for highly complex procedures that require a significant commitment of
resources and highly specialized teams (Lin et al. 1998). Organ transplantation is a clear
example of this type of procedure. One caution in using volumes as "indicators" of quality
is that studies of the association between volumes and outcomes examine patterns across
many hospitals, but the inference may not be true for individual hospitals or providers.
There can be a number of reasons, other than poor quality, to explain why specific
hospitals or providers may have low volumes, such as the start-up of new services, rural
location, or a procedure performed by a high-volume surgeon in several low-volume
hospitals. Furthermore, hospitals may have high volumes and quality for some procedures
but low volumes and quality for others, or volumes and quality may fluctuate over time.
Therefore, low volumes cannot be used as an overall "indicator" of poor quality, volume
standards will vary by procedure and disease, and it would be useful to have multiple
measures and longitudinal data. However, in the past one could reasonably say that in the
absence of other quality measures, one would probably have a higher likelihood of better
outcomes with a high volume provider than a low-volume provider (Hannan et al., 1999).
One of the controversial issues about volumes is whether an observed association
between higher volumes and better outcomes is a result of more experience leading to
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better outcomes, the "Practice-Makes-Perfect" hypothesis, or whether patients are attracted
to hospitals with better outcomes, thereby increasing their volumes, the "SelectiveReferral" hypothesis (Luft et al., 1990). That is, if increased volume is sufficient to
achieve better outcomes, then increases in volumes at selected sites will improve outcomes
(ignoring other problems such as access to care). However, if the observed volumeoutcome relationship reflects selective referrals to better quality providers, regulatory and
other "steering" strategies would need at least as effective indicators of quality and means
to choose the best providers. There is some evidence that both hypotheses may be true to
varying degrees for different procedures (Khuri, Daley & Henderson, 1999).
Higher levels of nurse staffing have also been associated with improved quality of
care in hospitals (Needleman, 2002). Teaching status and its relationship to quality of care
and outcomes have been examined across illnesses and procedures (Allison et al., 2000).
Many of these studies suggest that teaching hospitals have more favorable clinical
outcomes. Levels of expertise and staffing may be an underlying explanation for the
observed volume-outcome link; this could be modified to improve outcomes in lowvolume hospitals. Although procedure volume may be a convenient proxy for quality of
care, questions have been raised about the ramifications of policy making based on
volume. Although there appears to be a statistical link between volume and quality of
care, the nature of this link is still poorly understood. For example, recent studies have
compared morbidity and mortality at low- and high-volume centers for esophagectomy,
pancreatic resection, and carotid endarterectomy and suggest that volume alone is not a
sufficient signal of quality (Padmanabhan et al., 2002). These studies point to at least two
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additional factors that influence outcomes: surgeons‘ skill and experience, and the presence
of an organizational structure for assuring high quality of care, such as treatment protocols.
It is possible that for the most complex procedures, whether frequent or infrequent, the
hospitals providing them must maintain a certain level of staffing and technology. In
addition, a few specialized surgeons might perform these procedures at more than one
hospital, so an individual hospital‘s volume, whether high or low, is a poor proxy for
outcomes. Individual surgeon volume, staffing, or measures of the presence of key
technologies or practices, such as protocols, may be better measures. Such factors should
be further examined so in order to understand how best to improve quality and to provide
the basis for quality improvement initiatives. The link between volume and outcome for
high-technology, complex procedures is likely to be indirect and complex, reflecting at
least the organization of healthcare services and the skill and experience of staff.

Policy Implications
When CON regulations were introduced, healthcare providers were reimbursed
based on the cost of the services they provided, no matter how high that cost. Their
charges incorporated overhead expenses and the other costs of doing business, as well as
the necessary profit margin. ―Under that scheme overbuilding was costly to everybody
because the expenses of inefficiency were built into the reimbursements. The regulatory
mechanism of CON regulations was developed to control costs by limiting the expansion
of services in a geographic area‖ (Conover & Sloan, 1998). Now, some thirty years later,
the competitive forces of managed care have altered healthcare. Provider payments are
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determined by capitation, fixed fees for services, and fee schedules that are the product of
negotiation and have little or no bearing on the underlying costs. Today‘s providers
compete on price and quality of care-not costs-and are neither rewarded for nor bailed out
when they overspend on facilities or technology (Porter & Teisberg, 2004). Thus, CON
regulations may no longer be an appropriate tool to regulate healthcare costs. The free
market – as with virtually every other business endeavor - should be allowed to determine
need and encourage healthy competition based on price and quality of care (Porter &
Teisberg, 2004).
Although CON may be effective in limiting the expansion of some services
(transplant centers in this study), the role of CON programs on a national level should be
debated in the context of research evidence of the association of CON on the quality
outcomes. Thus, the findings in this study are important, despite the limitations, for the
ongoing debate regarding the lack of benefits of CON programs. This study found no
significant difference in transplant center volume or outcomes in states with and without
solid organ transplant CON regulations. This conclusion would lead one to ask: what is
the purpose of the continued presence of CON regulations for transplant services? In a
time when patient safety, medical errors, and patient outcomes as well as access and cost
are coming under greater scrutiny, CON regulations may not be an important and effective
regulatory mechanism for ensuring higher quality care and better patient outcomes.
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Appendix 1: CON Regulations by State

Current State CON?

Current Organ
Transplant CON?

Alabama

Yes

Yes

1979-present

Alaska

Yes

Yes

1976-present

Arizona

No

Arkansas

Yes

California

No

1969-1987

Colorado

No

1973-1987

Connecticut

Yes

Yes

1973-present

Delaware

Yes

No

1978-present

District of Columbia

Yes

Yes

1977-present

Florida

Yes

Yes

1973-present

Georgia

Yes

No

1979-present

Hawaii

Yes

Yes

1974-present

Idaho

No

Illinois

Yes

Indiana

No

State/District

Dates of Regulations

1971-1985

No

1975-present

1980-1983

Yes

1974-present

1980-1996, 1997-1999
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Current State CON?

Current Organ
Transplant CON?

Iowa

Yes

Yes

Kansas

No

Kentucky

Yes

Yes

1972-present

Louisiana

Yes

No

1991-present

Maine

Yes

Yes

1978-present

Maryland

Yes

Yes

1968-present

Massachusetts

Yes

Yes

1972-present

Michigan

Yes

Yes

1972-present

Minnesota

No

Mississippi

Yes

No

1979-present

Missouri

Yes

No

1979-present

Montana

Yes

No

1975-present

Nebraska

Yes

No

1979-present

Nevada

Yes

No

1971-present

New Hampshire

Yes

No

1979-present

New Jersey

Yes

Yes

1971-present

State/District

Dates of Regulations

1977-present

1972-1985

1971-1985
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State/District

Current State CON?

Current Organ
Transplant CON?

Dates of Regulations

New Mexico

No

1978-1983

New York

Yes

Yes

1966-present

North Carolina

Yes

Yes

1978-present

North Dakota

No

Ohio

Yes

No

1975-present

Oklahoma

Yes

No

1971-present

Oregon

Yes

No

1971-present

Pennsylvania

No

Rhode Island

Yes

Yes

1968-present

South Carolina

Yes

No

1971-present

South Dakota

No

Tennessee

Yes

Texas

No

1975-1985

Utah

No

1979-1984

Vermont

Yes

Yes

1979-present

Virginia

Yes

Yes

1973-present

1971-1995

1979-1996

1972-1988

No

1973-present
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Current State CON?

Current Organ
Transplant CON?

Washington

Yes

Yes

1971-present

West Virginia

Yes

Yes

1977-present

Wisconsin

Yes

No

1977-1987, 1993-present

Wyoming

No

State/District

Dates of Regulations

1977-1989
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Appendix 2: CON Services by State 2010
Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/LinearAccelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

AL

AK

AZ

AR

CA

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1

Total

1
21 Yes

1
20 Yes

No CON

1
7 Yes

No CON
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Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of
Columbia

Florida

Colorado

CT

DE

DC

FL

Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/LinearAccelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1

Total

No CON

21 Yes

1
9 Yes

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1

28 Yes

11 Yes
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Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

GA

HI

ID

IL

IN

1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

Total

1
18 Yes

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
27 Yes

1
1

No CON

1
16 Yes

No CON
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Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

IA

KS

KY

LA

ME

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

Total

9 Yes

No CON

1
19 Yes

1
1
1
3 Yes

24 Yes
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Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

MD

MA

MI

MN

MS

1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

Total

1
17 Yes

1
15 Yes

1
19 Yes

No CON

18 Yes
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Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New
Hampshire

MO

MT

NE

NV

NH

1

1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
Y
1

Total

1
15 Yes

7 Yes

1

2 Yes

4 Yes

13 Yes
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Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North
Carolina

North Dakota

NJ

NM

NY

NC

ND

1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1

Total

12 Yes

No CON

18 Yes

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
26 Yes

No CON
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Appendix 2: CON Services by State 2010
Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

OH

OK

OR

PA

RI

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

Total

1 Yes

1
5 Yes

4 Yes

No CON

20 Yes
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Appendix 2: CON Services by State 2010
Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

South
Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

SC

SD

TN

TX

UT

No CON

No CON

1

Total

1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
21 Yes

1
21 Yes

1
1

No CON
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Appendix 2: CON Services by State 2010
Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other
Total

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West
Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

VT

VA

WA

WV

WI

WY

1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
31 Yes

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1

1
1
20 Yes

1
18 Yes

1
22 Yes

3 Yes

No CON
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Appendix 2: CON Services by State 2010
Air Ambulance
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)
Burn Care
Cardiac Cath
Business Computers
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners
Gamma Knives
Home Health
Hospice
Hospitals/Beds
ICF/MR
Lithotripsy
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)
Medical Office Buildings
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)
Nursing Home/Beds
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)
Obstetrical
Open Heart Surgery
Solid Organ Transplant
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)
Psychiatric Beds
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator
Rehabilitation
Renal Dialysis
Residential Care/Assisted Living
Subacute Care
Substance Abuse
Swing Beds
Ultra Sound
Other

Number of States with CON for Service

7
27
12
26
1
13
16
17
18
28
22
16
27
2
19
16
37
23
15
25
21
20
26
23
25
12
5
14
18
12
4
18
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Appendix 3.
Hypothesis #1 Summary

Transplant Centers per State
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff = 4.94
NonCON > CON

ANOVA

df = 307

t = -2.397

Sig = .017

Significant

df = 1

F = 5.108

Sig = .025

Significant

Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff = 0.01317
CON > NonCON

ANOVA

df = 307

t = -.847

Sig = .398

Not Significant

df = 1

F = .717

Sig = .398

Not Significant

df = 99

t = -1.206

Sig = .231

Not Significant

df = 1

F = 1.245

Sig = .267

Not Significant

df = 206

t = -2.071

Sig = .040

Significant

df = 1

F = 3.870

Sig = .051

Significant

Heart Transplant Centers per State
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff = 4.62
NonCON > CON

ANOVA

Kidney Transplant Center per State
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff = 5.11
NonCON > CON

ANOVA

Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff = 0.0059
CON > NonCON

ANOVA

df = 99

t = -.510

Sig = .611

Not Significant

df = 1

F = .260

Sig = .611

Not Significant

Kidney Transplant Center per 100,000 Residents
Independent Sample T-Test
ANOVA

Mean Diff = 0.0169
CON > NonCON

df=206

t =-.665

Sig=.507

Not Significant

df=1

F=.443

Sig=.507

Not Significant
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Hypothesis #2 Summary

Transplant Volume per Center
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff = 15.4
CON > NonCON

ANOVA

df = 307

t = .565

Sig = .572

Not Significant

df = 1

F = .319

Sig = .572

Not Significant

Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff = 2.0764
CON > NonCON

ANOVA

df = 307

t = 1.187

Sig = .236

Not Significant

df = 1

F = 1.408

Sig = .236

Not Significant

df = 99

t = -.022

Sig = .983

Not significant

df = 1

F = .000

Sig = .983

Not Significant

df = 206

t = 1.024

Sig = .307

Not Significant

df = 1

F = 1.048

Sig = .307

Not Significant

Heart Transplant Volume per Center
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff =
CON > NonCON

ANOVA

Kidney Transplant Volume per Center
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff =
CON > NonCON

ANOVA

Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Independent Sample T-Test

Mean Diff =
CON > NonCON

ANOVA

df = 99

t = -.071

Sig = .944

Not Significant

df = 1

F = .005

Sig = .944

Not Significant

Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents
Independent Sample T-Test
ANOVA

Mean Diff =
CON > NonCON

df = 206

t = 1.407

Sig = .161

Not Significant

df = 1

F = 1.980

Sig = .161

Not Significant
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Hypothesis #3 Summary

Ratio of Observed to Expected Graft Failures (1 year)
Independent Sample T-Test
ANOVA

df = 307
df = 1

t = -1.841
F = 3.390

Sig = .067
Sig = .067

Not Significant
Not Significant

Sig = .115
Sig = .115

Not Significant
Not Significant

Sig = .298
Sig = .298

Not Significant
Not Significant

Sig = .287
Sig = .287

Not Significant
Not Significant

Sig = .133
Sig = .120

Not Significant
Not Significant

Ratio of Observed to Expected Graft Failures – Heart (1 year)
Independent Sample T-Test
ANOVA

df = 99
df = 1

t = -1.590
F = 2.528

Ratio of Observed to Expected Graft Failures – Kidney (1 year)
Independent Sample T-Test
ANOVA

df = 206
df = 1

t = -1.044
F = 1.091

Ratio of Observed to Expected Patient Deaths (1 year)
Independent Sample T-Test
ANOVA

df = 307
df = 1

t = -1.068
F = 1.140

Ratio of Observed to Expected Patient Deaths – Heart (1 year)
Independent Sample T-Test
ANOVA

df = 99
df = 99

t = -1.517
F = 2.457

Ratio of Observed to Expected Patient Deaths – Kidney (1 year)
Independent Sample T-Test
ANOVA

Df = 206
Df = 206

t = -.564
F = .043

Sig = .574
Sig = .836

Not Significant
Not Significant
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